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An estimated one in three American adults has a criminal record. While
some records are for serious offenses, most are for arrests or relatively lowlevel misdemeanors. In an era of heightened security concerns, easily
available data, and increased criminal background checks, these records act
as a substantial barrier to gainful employment and other opportunities.
Harvard sociologist Devah Pager describes people with criminal records as
“marked” with a negative job credential.
In response to this problem, lawyers have launched unmarking
programs to help people take advantage of legal record clearing remedies.
We studied a random sample of participants in one such program to analyze
the impact of the record clearing intervention on employment outcomes.
Using methods to control for selection bias and the effects of changes in the
economy in our data, we found evidence that: (1) the record clearing
intervention boosted participants’ employment rates and average real
earnings, and (2) people sought record clearing remedies after a period of
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School of Law. Justin McCrary is a Professor of Law at the UC Berkeley School of Law and
Director of the Social Science Data Laboratory at UC Berkeley. Joshua Epstein is a 2017
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Berkeley, and UCLA for feedback, UC Berkeley School of Law students Julia Van de Walle
and Emily Puhl for research assistance, UC Berkeley School of Law statistician Su Li for data
tabulation, Olivia Layug Balbarin for editorial assistance, East Bay Community Law Center
Clean Slate Director Eliza Hersh for invaluable input, and the staff and clients at the East Bay
Community Law Center for their collaboration.
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suppressed earnings.
More research needs to be done to understand the durability of the
positive impact and its effects in different local settings and labor markets,
but these findings suggest that the record clearing intervention makes a
meaningful difference in employment outcomes for people with criminal
records. The findings also suggest the importance of early intervention to
increase employment opportunities for people with criminal records. Such
interventions might include more legal services, but they might also include
record clearing by operation of law or another mechanism that does not put
the onus of unmarking on the person with a criminal record.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the developed
world.1 Almost seven million Americans are in prison or under correctional
supervision.2 People of color in general and African-Americans in particular
are grossly overrepresented in the prison population.3 Mass incarceration is
widely viewed as discriminatory, costly, and inhumane, and facilitating the
reentry of people released from prison has become a bipartisan concern.4
Mass incarceration and reentry, however, are only the tip of the criminal
justice iceberg, obscuring the underlying and broader phenomenon of mass
criminalization.5 The FBI reports that almost 74 million people, or nearly
1
ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON POPULATION
LIST 2 (11th ed. 2016) (finding that the prison population rate in the United States at the end
of 2015—698 per 100,000—was lower only than that of the East African archipelago of
Seychelles).
2
Danielle Kaeble et al., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 1
(2016), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf.
3
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014, at 1
(2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14_Summary.pdf (“Black men had the highest
imprisonment rate in every age group and were in state or federal facilities 3.8 to 10.5 times
more often than white men and 1.4 to 3.1 times more often than Hispanic men . . . [B]lack
females were between 1.6 and 4.1 times more likely to be imprisoned than white females
across all age groups.”).
4
See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010)
(signed by President Obama to reduce the racially-driven disparity in the sentencing of crack
and cocaine related offenses); Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–199, 122 Stat.
657 (2007) (signed by President Bush to provide grants to organizations facilitating prison
reentry); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
ST
FOR THE 21 CENTURY 4–5 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/
08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf (recommending reform of the criminal justice system through
conservation of prosecutorial and law enforcement resources for the most serious crimes,
sentencing reform, alternatives to incarceration, and support of reentry initiatives to reduce
recidivism). But see Perry Bacon, Jr., Are Bipartisan Efforts on Criminal Justice Reform at
an Impasse?, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/arebipartisan-efforts-criminal-justice-reform-impasse-n584921 (arguing that bipartisan criminal
justice reform efforts have stalled). The mass incarceration phenomenon was popularized with
the publication of MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010).
5
Mass criminalization has received renewed attention recently. See Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1056–69 (2015) (noting that, while
many jurisdictions are shortening drug sentences and closing prisons, people convicted of
nonjailable misdemeanors still often face more discrete punitive measures such as probation,
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one-third of American adults, have a criminal record, mostly for arrests not
leading to a conviction and misdemeanors.6 Evidence suggests that by the
age of twenty-three, almost one-half of all African-American and Latino
men, more than one-third of white men, and almost one in eight women have
been arrested.7
Maintained in court files or as records of arrests and prosecutions (“RAP
sheets”) in state and federal repositories, criminal records create collateral
consequences that often serve as lifelong obstacles to a range of benefits and
opportunities.8
Harvard sociologist Devah Pager and others have
documented the particularly harmful effect of criminal records on
employment outcomes.9 Although the specific labor market effects vary
across demographic groups and by sectors of the economy, people with
criminal records of any kind experience lower employment rates and earnings
than people without such records. According to Pager, criminal records
“mark” their owners with a negative job credential.10
Because criminal records can exist indefinitely, employment barriers
fines, criminal records, and collateral consequences); Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s
Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 325 (2015). But overcriminalization
and its harmful effects are not new concepts and concerns. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis
of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 157 (1967) (arguing
that “[t]he use of criminal law to enforce morals, to provide social services, and to avoid legal
restraints on law enforcement, to take just three examples, has tended both to be inefficient
and to produce grave handicaps for enforcement of the criminal law against genuinely
threatening conduct.”); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
703, 712 (2005) (describing overcriminalization as a socio-political phenomenon).
6
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION MONTHLY FACT
SHEET, AUGUST 2017 MONTHLY STATISTICS (2017), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ngimonthly-fact-sheet/view (showing that, as of the date of the fact sheet, there were 73, 796, 661
unique criminal records in the database).
7
Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages
18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 476 (2014).
8
See generally Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral
Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 25 (Sept. 2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
241927.pdf.
9
See, e.g., DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 17 (2007); Harry J. Holzer et al., The Effect of an Applicant’s Criminal
History on Employer Hiring Decisions on Screening Practices: Evidence from Los Angeles,
in BARRIERS TO REENTRY?: THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 117, 122 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007); Jenny Roberts, Why
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 277, 299–300 (2011).
10
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 942 (2003). Pager’s
audit study also found striking disparities in treatment by race. African-Americans with and
without criminal records fared much worse in receiving employment callbacks than their white
counterparts. “In fact, even whites with criminal records received more favorable treatment
(17%) than blacks without criminal records (14%).” Id. at 958.
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can last a lifetime. NYU law professor James Jacobs calls this phenomenon
“the eternal criminal record.”11 Further, public access to such records is a
uniquely American phenomenon. European countries maintain criminal
records, but court files and data in official public repositories are treated as
highly personal. Criminal records can only be released to the person with the
record, or to the police, prosecutors, or judges, and under limited
circumstances.12 The United States is even more exceptional in making arrest
records publicly available.13
Policymakers have responded to the durability and accessibility of
criminal records with strategies to reduce their collateral consequences,
especially their negative impact on employment outcomes. States are
updating and expanding a variety of record clearing remedies that mostly
predate the modern era in which such records have become ubiquitous and
consequential.14 Some jurisdictions have begun to limit the use of criminal
records by employers in the hiring process. Though employers may still
conduct criminal background checks toward the end of the hiring process, socalled “ban-the-box” policies typically forbid employers from asking about
criminal history in the early stages, including on the job application and
during initial interviews.15
11

JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 4 (2015).
Id. at 159; see also James Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The
United States, the European Union and Interpol Compared, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 125, 142–43 (2008) (explaining that European prison and probation services, along with
customs offices, will often have access to criminal record information and that some European
Union countries require the person with a criminal record to provide a reason for requesting
access to it—e.g., a desire to obtain a hunting permit or verify the accuracy of what is in the
record).
13
See Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 12, at 160, 194–208 (noting that no other country makes
such records available and that the U.S. approach “is dictated by the First Amendment and by
constitutional, political, and cultural commitment to governmental, especially judicial,
transparency”).
14
RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, 2009–2014, at 23 (2014),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/states-rethink-collateralconsequences-report-v3.pdf (describing how twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
enacted such laws between 2009 and 2014).
15
See NATHAN JAMES, OFFENDER REENTRY: CORRECTIONAL STATISTICS, REINTEGRATION
INTO THE COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM 18 (Jan. 12, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL34287.pdf (describing federal efforts to incentivize hiring of people with records, which
include the Work Opportunity Tax Credits Program and the Federal Bonding Program); BETH
AVERY & PHIL HERNANDEZ, NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES,
AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE HIRING POLICIES TO ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS
1
(Aug.
2017),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf.
The federal government and several state governments, including California, now offer tax
breaks to companies that hire people with criminal records. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax.
12

SELBIN

6

1/25/18 11:13 AM

SELBIN, MCCRARY & EPSTEIN

[Vol. 108

Lawyers have responded to the criminal records problem by establishing
programs to help people obtain record clearing remedies.16 Such remedies
are generally available to people with records of arrests or relatively minor
infractions, misdemeanors, and low-level felonies.17 The goal of record
clearing programs is to provide clients with a “clean slate” when seeking
employment, licensing, promotions, and other opportunities.18 The promise
of the record clearing intervention is that it will help people with criminal
records gain access to more and better jobs, which in turn will reduce social
and economic hardship for individuals, families, and society.
While it is clear that people with criminal records face significant labor
market barriers, we are just beginning to understand if, how, and for whom
interventions such as ban-the-box policies and criminal record clearing
improve employment outcomes. In fact, recent evidence suggests that the
impact of ban-the-box policies may be mixed. In the absence of screening
job applicants based on criminal records, researchers have found that
employers may engage in so-called “statistical discrimination,” disfavoring
minority job applicants relative to white applicants.19 These findings remind
us that interventions can have uncertain and unintended consequences.20
Code § 17053.34 (2012) (providing that a qualifying employer who hires a person with a
criminal record may claim a tax credit).
16
See infra Section II.
17
See Margaret Love, Restrictions on Access to Criminal Records: A National Survey,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., (Mar. 9, 2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/
2017/03/09/restrictions-on-access-to-criminal-records-a-national-survey/
(providing
an
overview of record clearing remedies nationwide).
18
REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE AND
YOU’RE OUT: HOW WE CAN ELIMINATE BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MOBILITY FOR
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 34 (Dec. 2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf.
19
See generally Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and
Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment, MICH. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES (2016),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 (a study of
employment callback rates in New York and New Jersey before and after enactment of banthe-box policies; while such rates did increase for African-American applicants after
enactment, they increased at a higher rate for white applicants, suggesting employers were
discriminating against African-American applicants in the absence of being able to use
criminal records as a screening mechanism); Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does
“Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and
Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are Hidden (Jan. 2017), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2812811 (finding that ban-the-box policies decrease the probability
of being employed by 5.1% for young, low-skilled African-American men, and by 2.9% for
young, low-skilled Hispanic men, supporting the hypothesis that employers statistically
discriminate against certain demographic groups when applicants’ criminal history is
unavailable).
20
The authors of a leading ban-the-box study acknowledge that their research does not
necessarily answer questions about the effect of the intervention on actual employment
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Lawyers have developed criminal record clearing programs under the
assumption that unmarking reduces barriers to employment for people with
criminal records, but we actually know very little about the relationship
between record clearing and employment outcomes.21 It is unlikely that
employers make hiring decisions based solely on the presence of a criminal
record, independent of other considerations. In addition, a criminal record
may interact simultaneously or synergistically with a host of other
characteristics that can impact employment opportunities and outcomes, such
as race, education, and work history.22
To begin to answer whether the record clearing intervention improves
employment outcomes for people with criminal records, we conducted a
retrospective timeframe study of a random sample of several hundred clients
who received legal assistance from the East Bay Community Law Center’s
Clean Slate Clinic in Alameda County (Oakland), California. We gathered
and analyzed clients’ employment rates and average real earnings reported to
the Social Security Administration before and after assistance by the clinic.
By doing this with four cohorts of clients over time, we in effect created
treatment groups (those who received the record clearing intervention) and
control groups (those who had yet to receive the intervention), which allows
us to say something meaningful about employment outcomes related to the
intervention.
outcomes. See Agan & Starr, supra note 19, at 32. Their research focuses on initial employer
responses in scheduling callbacks, not on applicants getting a job. Id. The National
Employment Law Project and other ban-the-box advocates have criticized those who invoke
the findings of the Agan and Starr study to call for the repeal of ban-the-box. Id. See also
BETH AVERY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, RACIAL PROFILING IN
HIRING: A CRITIQUE OF NEW “BAN THE BOX” STUDIES (Aug. 11, 2016), available at
http://www.nelp.org/publication/racial-profiling-in-hiring-a-critique-of-new-ban-the-boxstudies (arguing that the central problem illuminated by critiques of the ban-the-box policy is
not the policy itself but the tendency to associate blackness with criminality in the hiring
process and arguing further that ban-the-box is working by increasing employment
opportunities for people with records while changing the attitudes of employers).
21
Our study is part of a nascent empirical literature assessing the relationship between
record clearing and employment outcomes. The closest analog we are aware of is Charles E.
Loeffler et al., Estimating the Labor Market Effects of the Criminal Record Expungement and
Sealing (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (examining a large
cohort of clients screened by a legal aid office and comparing eligible and ineligible applicants
to identify a short-term improvement in employment probabilities based on statewide
Unemployment Insurance wage data). We are aware of at least two record clearing programs
that have undergone quantitative evaluations. See infra note 182.
22
In the ban-the-box context, as noted above, recent studies have demonstrated the
relationship between employment strategies and racial discrimination. See supra notes 19 and
20 and accompanying text. One research team found, however, that education (a GED) and
employment history (job gap) did not have a significant impact on job callbacks. See Agan &
Starr, supra note 19, at 28.
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While there are limits to our data and method, we can report at least two
important findings about the relationship between the record clearing
intervention and employment outcomes:
First, the record clearing intervention appeared to boost both average
employment rates and average earnings. Average employment rates grew in
the years after the intervention from roughly 75% to 80%-85%. For reasons
that are not clear, employment rates declined slightly three years after the
intervention, though they were still above baseline rates. Average real
earnings increased slightly during the first year of the intervention and rose
rapidly thereafter—within three years of participation, earnings grew from
$4,000 below baseline to nearly $2,000 above baseline, a significant
magnitude ($6,000) equal to roughly one-third of total average earnings.
Second, participants sought the record clearing remedy after a period of
suppressed earnings, in spite of relatively active and stable employment
rates.23 Their formal incomes were very low from the outset, averaging less
than 40% of earnings among local residents. In the wake of the early 2000s
recession, participants’ average annual earnings fell from roughly $20,000 to
$18,000.24 Average earnings increased to over $22,000 leading up to the
great recession but plummeted to just over $14,000 in 2009. This precipitous
drop during the great recession was much more rapid and sharp for those with
criminal records than for all local residents, likely as a result of the fragile
labor market for people with criminal records. When controlling for other
factors, participants’ average real earnings are about 20 percent ($4,000)
below their baseline earnings ($18,000) prior to seeking record clearing.
Such evidence supports arguments for expanding the availability of the
intervention. The record clearing intervention might be even more impactful
if it were available sooner to help prevent declining earnings and more
effective if it were available by operation of law or another mechanism that
did not put the burden of unmarking on the person with a criminal record.
These relatively simple approaches—more programs, earlier intervention,
and automatic clearing—could increase the number of people availing
themselves of remedies that reduce the negative employment consequences
of criminal records.
In Part I of this Article, we describe the criminal records problem in the
United States, where tens of millions of people have relatively minor records
that serve as a barrier to employment and other opportunities. In Part II, we
describe the record clearing intervention, which is designed to overcome the
barriers described in Part I. In Part III, we profile the East Bay Community
23

This phenomenon is consistent with the literature on job training programs, which we
discuss in more detail below. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
24
All figures are in 2015 dollars.
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Law Center’s Clean Slate Clinic, a record clearing program that served as the
site of inquiry for this study. In Part IV, we explain our study methods to
measure the impact of the record clearing intervention on employment
outcomes. In Part V, we detail our findings and consider their implications
for policy and research.
I. MARKING: THE CRIMINAL RECORDS PROBLEM
The criminal records problem in the United States is the product of
several converging trends in recent decades. Federal and state policies fueled
a dramatic increase in civilian encounters with law enforcement, which
disproportionately impacted communities of color.25 Records of these
encounters have become easily accessible due to the vast information-sharing
infrastructure made possible by the internet and facilitated by permissive
state and federal laws. Further, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and ensuing security
fears increased the demand for publicly available criminal records.26
Although criminal records take many forms, our study is concerned
primarily with those maintained in courthouses, which form the basis for
RAP sheets stored in state and federal repositories.27 Easy access to such
criminal record information is a uniquely American phenomenon that enables
discrimination and imposes hardship on people with criminal records in
almost every sector of society.28 Barriers to employment for people with
criminal records are particularly high, as background checks have become a
routine and often dispositive feature of the job application process.29 These
obstacles serve as an ongoing form of punishment for people with criminal
records.
In this Part, we explore the factors that contributed to the criminal
records problem, the collateral consequences of criminal records, and the
special employment challenges facing people with criminal records.
A. MASS CRIMINALIZATION AND RECORDS

Since the mid-1960s, tens of millions of people have been arrested and
25
See JACOBS, supra note 11, at 2 (explaining that the war on drugs and adoption of zero
tolerance and broken windows approaches to crime management disproportionately impacted
African-Americans—in some cities, as many as 80% of young African-American men have a
record).
26
Id. at 6 (highlighting how Congress responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by passing
laws subjecting around one million workers to background checks).
27
Id. at 11 (describing the myriad forms of criminal records in addition to court records
and RAP sheets, including criminal intelligence databases, police blotters, presentence reports,
prosecutors’ files, probation files, and jail and prison databases).
28
Id. at 5 (describing American exceptionalism regarding access to criminal records).
29
See infra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
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prosecuted for relatively low-level offenses.30 This surge in civilian
encounters with the criminal justice system is attributable at least in part to
changes in state and federal policy rather than an increase in criminal
behavior.31 In the wake of President Johnson’s “war against crime,”32 local
law enforcement agencies swelled with federal Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration grant money,33 which critics argued was used to militarize the
police.34 These grants grew from $300 million in 1968 to $1.25 billion in
1974.35
Federal and state financial support of law enforcement continued to pour
in under President Reagan’s implementation of the racially charged “war on
drugs” and prevailing “tough on crime” political attitudes.36 In 1981,
30
See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS
11 (Apr. 2009), available at https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor (estimating that
between 1972 and 2006, the number of annual non-traffic related misdemeanor prosecutions
rose from 5 million to 10.5 million); Robert LaFountain et al., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.
Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court Caseloads 24 (2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/
CSP_DEC.ashx (revealing that in 2010, 77.8% of all cases in seventeen state courts systems
were misdemeanors); Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1057 (estimating that 10 million misdemeanor
cases are filed annually in the United States, representing about 80% of state dockets); Jenny
Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013)
(describing how the criminal justice system has remained busy by targeting petty misdemeanor
offenses even as rates of serious crimes declined over the last two decades).
31
See Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?, in
DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 65 (Stephen
Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, The Role of Violent Crime
in U.S. Incarceration Rates (May 2000), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/usa/
Rcedrg00-02.htm#TopOfPage. But see ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41 (acknowledging rising
crime rates in the 1960s).
32
See, e.g., Elizabeth Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME (Mar.
20, 2015), http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/.
33
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 created the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration and made it the conduit for grants that facilitated officer
recruitment, training, and equipment purchases. See The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
34
MALCOLM FEELEY & AUSTIN SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY
AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968–1978 137 (1980)
(describing how liberal critics of the Nixon administration viewed the purchase of anti-riot
and military grade gear as an attempt to subdue legitimate anti-war and civil rights protests).
But see id. at 137–38 (observing that local expenditures of grant money veered away from
equipment and police forces in the late 1970s).
35
Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 9, 13 (1999). LEAA grants surged, but they were still a relatively small fraction of
overall police budgets. During the same time that the number of officers increased, so did
violent and property crime.
36
See PAGER, supra note 9, at 18 (explaining that a discourse that placed the blame for
crime on the moral failings of the individual, rather than on society, helped drive the rise of
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President Reagan signed into law the Military Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Act, which granted police forces access to military weaponry
and intelligence in exchange for a promise to prioritize drug law
enforcement.37 The Byrne grant program enticed the same commitment from
local police forces through millions of dollars in federal aid.38 In some
instances, federal funding was directly tied to arrest rates, fueling an increase
in apprehensions.39
These changes to federal and state funding for law enforcement
coincided with an overhaul of penal laws.40 The federal Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 rejected judicial discretion in favor of mandatory minimum
sentences for crimes that were previously punished with community service
and supervision,41 and state legislatures followed suit.42 State and federal
penal codes also expanded to include new crimes as lawmakers sought to
assuage public fears of epidemic crime.43 As a result of increased policing,
tough on crime politics); see also Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton:
How the Tough On Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment
Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 1, 3, 16–19 (2013).
37
Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act Pub. L. No. 97–86, 95 Stat. 1099
(1981); ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77.
38
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1968)
(authorizing the Byrne Grant Program); ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77; see also Eric
Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 42 (1998) (explaining that the Byrne program became the conduit for
federal aid to local law enforcement after the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
expired in 1982; federal funds under Byrne had to go towards waging the Drug War, unlike
grants under the LEAA).
39
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77 (summarizing a 2001 report in Wisconsin that
found that the extent of federal funds for local law enforcement was positively correlated with
the number of drug arrests); id. at 78–79 (describing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention Control Act of 1970 as the origin of modern drug forfeiture laws and explaining
that paramilitary drug raids increased from about 300 in 1972 to 3,000 in 1980); RODNEY
BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 221–
22 (2013). Lax drug forfeiture laws encouraged police departments to keep the spoils of
increasingly frequent drug raids.
40
See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK 22 (2005) (explaining how electoral
politics shaped crime policy in the aftermath of urban riots and protests, resulting in the
collapse of discretionary sentencing).
41
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE § 1:5 (2016). The introduction to the Sentencing
Guidelines predicted that the guidelines would apply to 90% of federal criminal cases,
although the ultimate goal was to cover all of them. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.5 (1987). But see Stanley Weigel, The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 97 (1988) (explaining that
the guidelines were quickly amended to exclude class B and C misdemeanors).
42
Mauer, supra note 35, at 11.
43
See THE SMART ON CRIME COAL., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SMART ON CRIME:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 2
(2011),
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harsher punishments, and expanded crimes, more people than ever came into
contact with the criminal justice system, often for relatively minor offenses.
The newly expansive reach of the criminal justice system and
subsequent increase in the number of people with criminal records was
accompanied by an equally dramatic transformation in the availability of
criminal history information. Technological developments—such as the
replacement of manual record keeping with more automated court and
criminal justice systems—have enabled unprecedented access to and
dissemination of criminal records.44 Perhaps most importantly, the Internet
has greatly increased the ease of a criminal record check, replacing a trip to
the courthouse in some states with a cursory online search.45
Technological advances might have had little impact on the availability
of criminal records without developments in state and federal law that have
facilitated organization of and public access to massive quantities of criminal
record data. In 1967, President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice made the case for an efficient nationwide
system for sharing criminal history information.46 Because such a system
would be defined by the information it received from the states, the
Department of Justice issued regulations in the mid-1970s requiring states to

https://constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SmartOnCrime_Complete.pdf
(documenting the expansion of the federal criminal code); Mauer, supra note 35, at 15
(elucidating the relationship between the media’s sensationalistic coverage of crime and public
support for harsh penal policy); Roberts, supra note 30, at 1090 (noting the growth in
misdemeanor crimes); William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 532 (2001) (describing how the public’s perception of increasing criminality can
trigger lawmakers to add new crimes to penal codes in an effort to comfort voters).
44
NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE
ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 29 (2005),
http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf.
45
The internet also provides a forum for advertising commercial background check
services, augmenting awareness of their availability. Id. at 14. Note that in some states,
including California, background check companies are still required to review records in
person at the courthouse. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(c) (West 2002) (requiring background
check companies to verify the accuracy of arrest, indictment, and conviction records prior to
producing a report about those records); id. at § 1786.28(a) (requiring background check
companies transmitting criminal record information to indicate the source of the information—
which may be a court—and the date it was publicized); id. at § 1786.28(b) (requiring
background check companies that are furnishing criminal record information to a prospective
employer to maintain procedures designed to ensure that the information that the companies
provide is current).
46
JACOBS, supra note 11, at 40 (describing how this push for a nationwide system resulted
in a national RAP sheet system called the Interstate Identification Index, which allows a law
enforcement officer anywhere in the country to check, almost instantaneously, whether a
suspect has a criminal record in any jurisdiction).
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maintain accurate and complete criminal records.47
States responded by establishing central repositories for criminal record
storage and adopting their own laws concerning dissemination of such
information.48 These laws occupy a spectrum ranging from laxity (allowing
disclosure of every non-expunged record on file) to strict regulation (limiting
public disclosure to adult conviction data that are less than ten years old).49
Notably, however, these restrictions apply only to the criminal records
housed in state repositories. They do not apply to criminal records in the
courthouses themselves, which historically have been open for constitutional
and policy reasons.50 Today, court records in forty-eight states are easily
accessible online.51
If state and federal law enforcement policies and priorities increased the
number of people with criminal records, and law and technology expanded
ease of access to such records, post-9/11 security fears increased the demand
for records.52 In the wake of the 2001 attacks, Congress passed laws
requiring background checks on truck drivers transporting hazardous
materials (the Patriot Act),53 workers with access to secure portions of the
airport (the Aviation and Transportation Security Act),54 and people who
work with biological agents.55 Private employers turned to background check
companies more frequently after the attacks, adding security fears to the list
of business justifications for conducting the checks.56
47

See 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(a) (1976).
NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note 44, at 38 (describing how the
DOJ regulations gave states the freedom to develop their own laws).
49
Id. at 40.
50
Policy reasons include maintenance of the public’s trust in the integrity of the judicial
system and insulation from attempts to usurp the courts for private purposes. See id. at 45; see
also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that there is
a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials.
51
Privacy/Public Access to Court Records: State Links, NAT. CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/topics/access-and-fairness/privacy-public-access-to-court-records/statelinks.aspx (last visited May 16, 2016) (providing a list of forty-eight states plus the federal
government that offer online links to court records).
52
NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note 44, at 1.
53
See 49 U.S.C. § 5103a (2001). At the time of its passage, the law subjected an estimated
3.5 million employees to background checks. Ruth Graham, How Criminal Records Hold
Americans Back, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 8, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2015/03/
08/how-criminal-records-hold-americans-back/bFnOmPhZKeimlafcPU5mmI/story.html.
54
49 U.S.C. § 5103a(d) (2001); id. at § 114(f)(12).
55
Public Health Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Act of 2002, Pub. L.
107–188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
56
For example, two days after 9/11, Empire International spent $40,000 on background
checks for its 500 drivers; within a week of the attacks, Comforce Corporation ordered
background checks on all employees in the information technology or internet security
divisions. Eve Tahmincioglu, Tense Employers Step Up Background Checks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
48
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Background check companies benefited from heightened security
concerns. ChoicePoint, for example, reported a 30% increase in business
from security firms immediately after 9/11, and HireCheck reported a 25%
increase in business overall.57 Background check companies registered
surging revenue associated with employee screening even as hiring faltered
in the economy overall.58 In the post-9/11 era of heightened security, new
safety worries fueled expansion in an already growing criminal record
information industry.59
B. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL RECORDS

Taken together, aggressive criminalization, advanced technology, a
permissive legal framework, and heightened security concerns have left a
huge number of Americans marked by criminal records. According to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, approximately 74 million Americans, or
almost one of every three adults, have files in the nation’s master criminal
database.60 The FBI adds 10,000 to 12,000 new names every day.61 As of its
most recent report on the issue, the U.S. Department of Justice identified
more than 105 million people with state criminal record files, including more
than 100 million records that are automated, although individuals may have
records in more than one state.62
While arrest and prosecution records are widespread across the adult
population, mass criminalization is heavily racialized. By the age of twentythree, almost half of all African-American men (49%) and Latino men (44%)
have been arrested.63 In San Francisco in 2013, 45.5% of all females arrested
were African-American even though they made up only 5.8% of the total

3, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/03/business/management-tense-employers-stepup-background-checks.html. See also NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note
44, at 35 (explaining that businesses often point to their bottom line to justify background
checks, emphasizing the cost of negligent hiring lawsuits, wasted training resources due to
recidivism-related employee turnover, and employee theft).
57
Tahmincioglu, supra note 56.
58
NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., supra note 44, at 32.
59
Tahmincioglu, supra note 56 (describing the pre-9/11 growth in criminal background
checks due to employers’ efforts to decrease liability associated with negligent hiring lawsuits).
60
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 6, at 1.
61
Gary Fields & John Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences
Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrestrecords-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402.
62
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2014: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY REPORT 2 (2015),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249799.pdf.
63
Brame et al., supra note 7.
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female population.64 These disparities exist even when controlling for
underlying criminal activity,65 so people of color are overrepresented among
those who are forced to navigate the increasingly intricate web of
consequences associated with a criminal record.
The consequences flowing from a criminal record extend beyond any
court-ordered punishment. These indirect consequences of an arrest or
prosecution are labeled “collateral,” and they are so myriad that Congress
tasked the National Institute of Justice with cataloging them in a nationwide
inventory.66 Across the nation, according to inventory estimates, people with
criminal records are subjected to roughly 45,000 sanctions, disabilities,
disqualifications, or other negative consequences.67 This total does not
provide a complete picture because private actors such as landlords and
employers can discriminate against people with criminal records even in the
absence of any state-promulgated law or rule.68
Significantly, collateral consequences attach not only to felonies, but
also to misdemeanors, which comprise roughly 80% of state court criminal
dockets.69 California law, for example, includes at least ninety mandatory
64

MICHAEL MALES, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., SAN FRANCISCO’S DISPROPORTIONATE
ARREST OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN PERSISTS 1 (2015), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/
documents/disproportionate_arrests_in_san_francisco.pdf.
65
For example, despite similar rates of marijuana use, African-Americans were almost
four times as likely as whites to be arrested for possession of marijuana between 2001 and
2010. EZEKIEL EDWARDS ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN
BLACK AND WHITE 4 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf.
66
See Project Description, JUSTICE CTR.: THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS,
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/description/#fn1 (last visited May 17, 2016)
(describing how a provision of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 directed the
National Institute of Justice to create the inventory [Public Law 110–177, Jan. 7, 2008]; the
American Bar Association ended up winning the contract).
67
Nat’l Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUSTICE CTR: THE
COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (last visited Sept. 12,
2017); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 1:2 (the introduction to the leading treatise on
collateral consequences).
68
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission warned in 2012 that such
discrimination in the employment setting, even when applied consistently against all people
with records, may be illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 given the extreme
likelihood of a disparate impact on racial minorities. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, EEOC: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT
DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm#I; see also David Thacher, The
Rise of Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 12 (2008)
(roughly four of every five landlords in the private market use background checks to screen
prospective tenants).
69
Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1057; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 101, 108 (2012) (estimating that in California, misdemeanors comprise 75 to

SELBIN

16

1/25/18 11:13 AM

SELBIN, MCCRARY & EPSTEIN

[Vol. 108

and 382 discretionary consequences associated with misdemeanor
convictions.70 In California, a misdemeanor conviction can lead to job loss,
disqualification from unemployment insurance,71 revocation of the right to
bear arms,72 and disqualification from serving as an alternative caregiver to a
child.73 A misdemeanor drug offense like simple possession can make a
student ineligible for federal loans.74
The consequences associated with misdemeanor convictions must be
considered in light of the high volume of such cases moving through the
criminal justice system and attendant concerns about due process. Ninetyfive percent of misdemeanor convictions are the result of people who have
pleaded guilty, often after speaking with a public defender for a few minutes,
or in some cases, not at all.75 With dockets overflowing, lower courts fail to
adequately scrutinize misdemeanor convictions and all too often approve illadvised plea agreements.76 Even people not convicted of misdemeanors can
suffer a range of collateral consequences from going through the system,
which raises serious questions about fairness and undue burdens.77

80% of filed cases).
70
See California, JUSTICE CTR.: THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS,
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/?jurisdiction=10 (last visited June 5, 2016).
71
See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1030.1 (1968).
72
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28905 (2010) (listing roughly forty misdemeanor convictions
that trigger a ten-year ban on the right to bear arms).
73
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 89378 (2002).
74
20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006).
75
See ALISA SMITH ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREE MINUTE
JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 7 (2011) (characterizing
misdemeanor courts in twenty-one Florida counties as “constitution-free zones” where twothirds of defendants plead guilty or no contest at their arraignments—which last only three
minutes—80% of the time); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives From Broken Windows: The
Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC.
CHANGE 271, 294–95 (2009) (explaining that though public defenders in New York City
theoretically have about 19.5 minutes with each client pre-arraignment—during which they
must review the client’s file, interview the client, explain potential charges and responses,
make bail arrangements, speak with family members in the court, confer with the district
attorney regarding potential dispositions and present the case to the court—in practice, plea
deals are so routine that many clients get even less time with their attorney); Natapoff, supra
note 5, at 1064.
76
Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1064.
77
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119
AM. J. OF SOC. 351, 386 (2013) (analyzing the flow of misdemeanor cases through the criminal
court in New York City and discovering that such a system affects even many people who
have not been convicted, marking them with a record, subjecting them to time-consuming
procedural hassle, and requiring compliance with court-dictated terms).
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C. CRIMINAL RECORDS AND EMPLOYMENT

Background checks have become a routine component of the job hunt
for Americans, making it difficult for many people with criminal records to
find work. As noted above, background checks mandated by federal law
have increased since 9/11,78 and state law trends are similar. Under the
authority of a 1972 federal law, state legislatures have enacted over 1,600
statutes requiring background checks by law enforcement agencies, including
the FBI.79 Many of these statutes require background checks for licensed
positions or employment in licensed facilities, affecting aspiring nurses,
caregivers, custodians, pet groomers, security guards, and barbers, to name a
few.80 A criminal record can also render a person ineligible for government
jobs.81
In the private sector, criminal background checks have become the
norm. According to a 2012 survey conducted by the Society of Human
Resources Management, an organization of mostly large employers, 87% of
its randomly selected members conducted criminal background checks on
some prospective employees and 69% conduct such checks on all
employees.82 Some employers discriminate further by telling people with

78

See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text.
See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(j) (West 2017) (granting the Director of the FBI the power to
exchange criminal record information with the states); Madeleine Neighly & Maurice
Emsellem, Wanted: Accurate FBI Background Checks for Employment, THE NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT 7 (July 2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/02/Report-WantedAccurate-FBI-Background-Checks-Employment-1.pdf; see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(a)(West
2017) (specifying that the exchange of such information can be used for employment and
licensing-related inquiries).
80
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 62, at Table 17 (cataloging
state laws requiring fingerprint-based background checks for nurses/elder caregivers (thirtyseven jurisdictions); daycare providers (forty-two jurisdictions); caregivers at residential
facilities (thirty-five jurisdictions); school teachers (forty-eight jurisdictions); nonteaching
school employees, including volunteers (forty jurisdictions); volunteers working with children
(thirty-one jurisdictions); prospective foster care parents (forty-eight jurisdictions);
prospective adoptive parents (forty-seven jurisdictions); relative caregivers (twenty-one
jurisdictions); and hazardous materials licensees (twenty-one jurisdictions)). Among the top
six licensed professions in California by number are nurses (400,134), teachers (295,025),
security guards (282,189), and cosmetologists (254,271). See also LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N,
REPORT #234, OCTOBER 2016: JOBS FOR CALIFORNIANS: STRATEGIES TO EASE OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING BARRIERS 17 (2016), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/report/jobs-californians-strategiesease-occupational-licensing-barriers.
81
See LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 2:8.
82
See SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING—THE USE OF
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS (2012), available at
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/pages/criminal
backgroundcheck.aspx.
79
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criminal records, including misdemeanors, not to apply at all.83
These trends have resulted in a massive number of criminal background
checks. The FBI released almost 17 million RAP sheets for the purpose of
employment and licensing background checks in 2012, a more than sixfold
increase since 2002.84 The California Attorney General processed over 2
million background checks in 2014.85 That same year, three of the largest
background check companies for private employers reported screening 56
million individuals nationwide.86
Inaccuracies in criminal history information exacerbate the employment
prospects of people with records. One study estimated that the failure to
update arrest records (to reflect that the arrest did not result in a conviction)
prejudices 600,000 people each year, and approximately one half of the
records in the FBI’s database are incomplete in some way.87 These
inaccuracies stem from deficiencies in states’ administration of records, on
which the FBI relies to update its database.88 Private background check
companies often share inaccurate information—according to critics, reports
produced by commercial screening companies frequently contain
information about the wrong person, report sealed records, omit the most
recent disposition of a case, render data in a misleading manner, misclassify
the type of offense (e.g., they report a misdemeanor as a felony), or report
information protected from disclosure by consumer and privacy laws.89
83

For example, a survey of Craigslist job ads revealed that employers large and small
frequently single out people with records by using language like: “DO NOT APPLY WITH
ANY MISDEMEANORS/FELONIES.” See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE
EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR
REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2011),
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/65_million_need_not_apply.pdf?nocdn=1. As noted above, this
practice may be unlawful under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s most
recent enforcement guidance for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires an
individualized assessment of a criminal record’s relevance to the job opportunity. See U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 68.
84
See Neighly & Emsellem, supra note 79, at 8.
85
“During the 2014 calender [sic] year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) processed more
than 2.1 million applicant fingerprint transactions.” See Applicant Agencies, STATE OF CAL.
DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/fingerprints/agencies (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
86
See Max Mihelich, Special Report: More ‘Background’ Noise, WORKFORCE (Sept. 5,
2014), http://www.workforce.com/2014/09/05/special-report-more-background-noise/.
87
Neighly & Emsellem, supra note 79, at 3; see also JACOBS supra note 11, at 42
(explaining that in 2012, only eighteen states had rap sheet databases that reported final
dispositions for more than 80% of arrests).
88
Neighly & Emsellem, supra note 79, at 2.
89
See PERSIS YU & SHARON DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., BROKEN RECORDS:
HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND
BUSINESSES
15
(2012),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-recordsreport.pdf; cf. Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.1 et seq. (1975) (the California Investigative Consumer
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Though most research has focused on the impact of a prison record on
employment opportunities, including low applicant callback rates and
depressed wages over time,90 criminal records of arrests and misdemeanors
can also serve as significant barriers to employment.91 A minor criminal
record can prevent a qualified applicant from being interviewed or getting a
job.92 Even an employer who expresses a willingness to hire applicants with
criminal records may not actually do so.93 A minor criminal record may also
be the basis of a licensing board’s denial or revocation of a professional

Reporting Agencies Act regulates background checks conducted by private companies); 15
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1970) (the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the criminal
background check industry and the reports that it produces on prospective employees).
90
See, e.g., SCOTT DECKER ET AL., CRIMINAL STIGMA, RACE, GENDER, AND EMPLOYMENT:
AN EXPANDED ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPRISONMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT 36
(2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244756.pdf (finding that a prison record
marginally decreased women’s chances of obtaining employment across racial groups);
PAGER, supra note 9, at 61–70 (finding in a landmark audit study of employers in Milwaukee
that a prison record decreases chances of receiving a callback by 50% for white males and
60% for African-American males); Christopher J. Lyons & Becky Pettit, Compounded
Disadvantage: Race, Incarceration, and Wage Growth, 58 SOC. PROBS. 257, 271 (2011)
(finding that within the studied cohort, the wages of African-American ex-inmates grew 21%
more slowly than did those of white ex-inmates); Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and
Economic Inequality, 74 SOC. RES. 509, 524 (2007) (explaining that African-American and
Hispanic men who have spent time in prison work about eight weeks less each year than
African-American and Hispanic men who have not spent time in prison, while white men who
have spent time in prison work only five weeks less each year than white men who have not).
91
See DECKER ET AL., supra note 90, at 53 (fourteen of forty-nine employers said they
probably would not hire someone who had been arrested and an additional four said that they
definitely would not); Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit
of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 637
(2014) (finding that a record of a misdemeanor arrest reduced the chance of a callback for
white and African-American males by 4%).
92
See Holzer et al., supra note 9, at 117, 122 (revealing that over 40% of surveyed
employers in Los Angeles definitely would not or probably would not be willing to hire
someone with a criminal record); Sarah Esther Lageson et al., Legal Ambiguity in Managerial
Assessments of Criminal Records, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 191 (2015) (finding that about
30% of “natural organizations”—employers who have no explicit policy on treatment of
criminal records in hiring—filtered out applicants with misdemeanor records in deciding who
to call back); Natapoff, supra note 5, at 113 (explaining that the majority of employers conduct
background checks and many choose not to interview people convicted of misdemeanors);
Roberts, supra note 9, at 299–300 (describing how employers easily access criminal record
information online and use it to avoid hiring people with records).
93
See Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus
What They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355, 364, 367 (2005) (finding that employers who had
expressed a willingness in their survey responses to hire those with criminal records were in
practice just as unlikely to hire them as those who had responded to the contrary); Lageson et
al., supra note 92, at 191 (showing that 78% of employers who expressed a willingness to hire
applicants with criminal records did not call back any of the applicants with misdemeanor
records).
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license.94 And although background check companies are not supposed to
report most criminal history information in California (including a
misdemeanor conviction) after seven years,95 a California regulatory
licensing agency can require that such information be available to prospective
employers indefinitely.96
Criminal records follow tens of millions of Americans like a shadow,
long after their arrest or any punishment associated with their crime has been
completed. Criminal records stigmatize people and create collateral
consequences that limit their opportunities. Even when a criminal record
does not serve as a complete bar to employment, it can affect employment
opportunities and earnings over time.97 In recent years, some states have
responded to this problem by enacting laws designed to mitigate the negative
effect of a criminal record on employment outcomes, yet obstacles persist for
many.
In the next Part, we discuss record clearing, or “unmarking,” which has
emerged in an effort to help people with criminal records overcome barriers
to employment.
II. UNMARKING: THE RECORD CLEARING REMEDY
Criminal record clearing remedies of one kind or another are available
in all fifty states.98 While the efficacy of judicial record clearing is the focus
of our inquiry, non-judicial remedies are available to people with records,
including executive pardon and administrative appeal.99 Judicial, executive,
and administrative remedies differ across the states and offer varying degrees
of relief from the penalties and collateral consequences associated with a
criminal record.100
94

See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 480 (West 1974) (allowing a licensing board that
regulates a license covered by the code to reject an application based on any conviction);
California, supra note 70 (showing that there are fifty mandatory consequences in the realm
of professional licensing for people with misdemeanor convictions).
95
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(a)(7) (West 1975).
96
See id. at § 1786.18(b)(2).
97
See generally SHAWN BUSHWAY ET AL., RUSSELL SAGE, BARRIERS TO REENTRY? THE
LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (2007); Simone
Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal-Record: Stigma
Reports among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387 (2016).
98
LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:1.
99
Id. at § 7:2.
100
As Loeffler et al., supra note 21, at 5–6 point out, people with criminal records have
also used informal, non-legal strategies to overcome employment obstacles. See generally
ROBERT SAMPSON & JOHN LAUB, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS
TO AGE 70 (2003) (describing how, before the age of the background check, the studied group
of juvenile delinquents was able to pass as non-criminal and thereby avoid labor market
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The executive pardon— a form of unmarking theoretically available in
every state—is rarely used.101 Few governors regularly exercise their pardon
power, and perhaps because of this, few people apply to be pardoned.102 Use
of the presidential pardon, which is the exclusive remedy available for people
convicted in federal court or in a military court-martial proceeding, has also
waned considerably in a trend that began during the Reagan
administration.103 Pardons generally are reserved for salient cases (e.g.,
evidence of innocence in association with many years served) and are neither
numerous enough nor targeted in such a way as to address the large number
of people with criminal records consisting of relatively minor offenses.
Administrative agencies offer people with criminal records another
potential source of relief. An individual facing denial or rescission of a
professional license or clearance to work in a licensed facility can generally
file an appeal.104 However, the laws, regulations, and practices vary from
state to state, within states, and across licensing entities. Although
administrative remedies are of increasing interest to policymakers seeking to
expand employment opportunities, they remain opaque and inaccessible to
many people with criminal records.105
discrimination); SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD
THEIR LIVES (2001) (observing that many people who have refrained from recidivating often
seek jobs for which their criminal record will not serve as an obstacle); NEAL SHOVER, AGING
CRIMINALS 75–76 (1985) (arguing that a group of people who repeatedly committed property
crimes eventually benefited from stigma erosion—a process by which a marked person’s
perceived criminality dissipates with time).
101
See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (holding that pardon not only terminates
punishment, but eradicates guilt so that “in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if
he had never committed the offence”). In every state but one, the state constitution is the source
of the power to pardon. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:6.
102
Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1720–21 (2003) (explaining
how the pardon application process has become increasingly difficult to navigate, often
requiring a substantial time commitment, submission to background checks and invasive
procedures, and completion of large amounts of paperwork).
103
See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1170–71 (2010). But see President Obama Announces Single Largest Set
of Clemency Grants Since Taking Office, CLEMENCY PROJECT 2014 (Aug. 3, 2016),
https://justiceroundtable.org/news-item/president-obama-announces-single-largest-set-ofclemency-grants-since-taking-office/ (noting that President Obama has commuted 562
sentences, more than any president since Calvin Coolidge).
104
LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:5.
105
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS (July 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf. Administrative
rules can also protect people with criminal records from discrimination. For example,
California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing is currently considering changes to
rules that would supplement the guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
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It is difficult to generalize about the wide variety of judicial record
clearing remedies. Such remedies predate the modern criminal records
problem, and they go by many names—expungement, expunction, dismissal,
vacatur, sealing, annulment, and set-asides. The benefits of the record
clearing remedies are equally varied. In some states, “sealing” and
“expungement” are synonymous, yet these terms can also have distinct
meanings, with “expungement” entailing the destruction of a record to which
“sealing” would merely prohibit access.106
Sealing and expungement remedies often permit people to state on some
employment applications that they have never been convicted when asked
about their criminal record history.107 Vacatur, set-aside and annulment are
forgiveness remedies.108 Under such remedies, people may still need to
disclose a criminal conviction when asked about it, but in theory they are
relieved from some forms of legally sanctioned discrimination.109
In this Part, we provide a brief overview of judicial record clearing. We
describe recent developments in public defender offices, civil legal aid
programs, and law school clinics designed to help people with criminal
records seek such judicial remedies as a means of overcoming the collateral
consequences outlined earlier. Finally, we note efforts by the federal
government to support and expand record clearing interventions.
Commission to limit the use of criminal records in the hiring process. See generally FAIR EMP.
& HOUS. COUNCIL, FURTHER MODIFICATIONS TO TEXT OF PROPOSED CONSIDERATION OF
CRIMINAL HISTORY IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS REGULATION (Sept. 7, 2016).
106
See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 18.
107
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency proposed a model act in 1962 that
exemplifies this approach to rehabilitation. See Nat’l Council on Crime &
Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of Crime: A Model Act, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 97, 100
(1962). Advocates of the “forget” approach to criminal record clearing remedies argue that the
ability of a person with a criminal record to reintegrate into society should not depend on
whether others are able to forgive. See JENNY ROBERTS, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW.,
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA’S FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 48–
49 (2014), available at https://www.nacdl.org/restoration/roadmapreport/.
108
See Love, supra note 102, at 1705 (arguing that forgiveness-oriented remedies are
superior to forgetting remedies like expungement because they do not proceed on the awkward
fiction—increasingly untenable in the information age—that the past can be re-written). The
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code advocated for a forgiveness-driven approach.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(3)(f) (1962) (stating that the code does not justify a defendant
in saying that he or she has not been convicted of a crime, unless he or she also mentions the
forgiveness granted by the model penal code). But see Roberts, supra note 5, at 338–41
(arguing that forgiveness is a conceptually strained approach in light of a flawed and racially
discriminatory criminal justice system in which culpability may be unrelated to a criminal
record).
109
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6 (allowing the court to enter an order relieving the
beneficiary of “any disqualification or disability imposed by law”); see also LOVE ET AL.,
supra note 41, at § 7:21.
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A. JUDICIAL RECORD CLEARING REMEDIES

All states provide an unmarking remedy for at least some people with
records of arrests and prosecutions, typically for arrests alone or less serious
crimes. In some states the remedies are very limited, but two-thirds of states
provide for sealing of records of arrests that did not lead to a conviction,
which happens either automatically or after a discretionary court order.110
Twenty-six states and Puerto Rico provide for judicial record clearing of
minor offenses, ranging from infractions to misdemeanors.111
Few states provide judicial record clearing remedies for felony
convictions and under much more narrow circumstances.112 Even in those
states, violent crimes and sex offenses generally do not qualify, and expunged
records can still be accessed for the purposes of sentencing a repeat
offender.113 Despite the range of judicial record clearing mechanisms in the
states, there is no expungement mechanism for records of federal arrests and
prosecutions.114
Recently, some state legislatures have begun expanding the scope of
judicial remedies. According to a survey of state laws conducted by the Vera
Institute, from 2009 to 2014, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia
enacted a total of thirty-seven new laws that create or expand record clearing
110

LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:21. In the majority of those states, sealing can
happen even after a defendant pleads guilty as part of deferred sentencing or adjudication. Id.
111
Id. at Chart 4, App. A.
112
See Love, supra note 102, at 1717 (explaining that the shift in political attitudes
towards crime around the time of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 caused legislatures to
begin weakening their expungement statutes).
113
LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:17. Puerto Rico has the most expansive record
clearing scheme, allowing for expungement of even violent felony offenses if five years have
elapsed since the sentence was served and the person has a “good reputation within the
community.” Id.; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, §§ 1725a-2 (1974).
114
LOVE ET AL., supra note 41, at § 7:17. Even non-conviction records, such as an arrest
without an indictment, cannot be cleared. Id. at § 7:20. However, federal judges can mitigate
the negative effects of a criminal record in other ways. See Order Denying Motion to Expunge
at 2, Jane Doe v. United States, No. 1:15-MC-01174 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (in which a now retired
federal judge cited congressional and executive reentry efforts to support his granting of a
“federal certificate of rehabilitation” for a defendant he had sentenced years before who had
subsequently struggled in the job market). And in 2014 the U.S. Sentencing Commission—
an independent agency of the federal judicial branch—voted to reduce the sentencing
guidelines for many federal drug offenses and made the reform retroactive. In late 2015, those
changes resulted in the release of over 6,000 people who were in federal prison. See Michael
Schmidt, U.S. to Release 6,000 Inmates from Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/us/us-to-release-6000-inmates-under-new-sentencingguidelines.html; The Marshall Project, What You Need to Know About the New Federal
Prisoner
Release,
THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Oct.
29,
2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/06/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-newfederal-prisoner-release#.AFxv6CN2H.
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remedies.115 Examples of such laws include extending record clearing
eligibility to people with prior convictions (as opposed to first-time
offenders) and juveniles,116 reducing the waiting periods preceding
eligibility, clarifying the effect of criminal record clearance, and lowering the
burden of proof required to clear a record.117
B. LEGAL INTERVENTION FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS

Lawyers in multiple settings have developed specialized initiatives to
assist people seeking criminal record clearing remedies. Some public
defender offices have moved in the direction of holistic defense, including
providing post-conviction record clearing assistance to clients.118 Civil legal
aid programs, traditionally focused on non-criminal matters, have begun
helping clients to overcome the collateral consequences of criminal
records.119 And law school teaching clinics have launched record clearing
projects as part of the response to mass criminalization in their
communities.120
115
See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13; Joshua Gaines, Excessive filing fees
frustrate new expungement schemes, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (June 3, 2016),
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/06/03/excessive-fees-frustrate-purpose-of-expungementlaws/ (lamenting the often prohibitively expensive filing fees associated with expungement in
Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee). But see Margaret Colgate Love, States “rethinking”
collateral consequences? Vera Institute jumps the gun, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES.
CTR. (Jan. 7, 2015), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/01/07/states-rethinking-collateralconsequences-not-fast-vera-institute/ (arguing that the Vera Institute’s report provides an
overly optimistic picture of the landscape of state law collateral consequences and suffers from
methodological flaws).
116
See Assem. 1945, Cal. State Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (clarifying that a
juvenile criminal record that has been sealed according to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 781 or 786 may only be revealed to the extent permitted by those sections).
117
See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13–17; Brian M. Murray, A New Era for
Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (2016).
118
See infra notes 122–26.
119
See infra note 129.
120
In addition to public defenders, civil legal aid programs, and law school clinics, private
sector attorneys have begun offering criminal record clearing services in recent years. For
example, the Fresh Start Law Center was founded in 2011 and focuses exclusively on criminal
record clearing in California. California Record Expungement, FRESH START LAW CTR.,
http://freshstartlawcenter.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). Criminal defense firms have also
started offering such services. For example, the Shouse California Law Group specializes in
criminal record clearing and has offices throughout the state. Expungement of Criminal
Records in California Penal Code 1203.4 PC, SHOUSE CAL. LAW GRP.,
http://www.shouselaw.com/expunge-criminal-records.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). More
research is needed to determine the extent of private sector criminal record clearing services,
but it appears that as the need for such assistance grows, the private sector will meet some of
the demand, at least for people who can afford to hire a lawyer.
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In the public defender setting, some offices have recently expanded the
traditional model of criminal defense representation. As awareness of the
collateral consequences of criminal records has grown, public defenders are
embracing a holistic approach to representation that extends beyond the
confines of the criminal case.121 Holistic representation has been described
as an effort to identify and treat the issues that brought the client into contact
with the criminal justice system in the first place in order to reduce harm and
prevent future criminal behavior.122 Public defender offices are beginning to
offer record clearing services to mitigate the impact of collateral
consequences, despite the fact that these civil penalties technically fall
outside the domain of criminal defense work.123
A comprehensive picture of record clearing work in public defender
offices is hard to paint due to variations in local jurisdictions. The Bronx
Defenders in New York City pioneered holistic representation, including
expungement services, in its Civil Action Practice.124 The San Francisco
Public Defender’s Office launched its Clean Slate Program in 1999; in 2015,
the program served over 6,570 people, obtaining sets asides and dismissals
of 514 convictions and reducing forty-six felonies to misdemeanors.125
Public defender offices operate record clearing programs in other California
cities,126 and in the District of Columbia, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati.127
121
See Robin Steinberg & David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public
Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 124 (2004). This embrace may
not always be voluntary. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that
public defenders must inform their clients when a plea poses a risk of deportation).
122
Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral
Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067,
1067 (2003).
123
Id. at 1073–74.
124
Civil Action Practice, THE BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/ourwork/civil-action-practice/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
125
S.F. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFF., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2016 CALENDAR: PUBLIC
DEFENDERS,
http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/2015-Report2016-Calendar.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
126
For example, the Orange County Public Defender’s Office operates the New Leaf
Program and “assists those who are seeking a fresh start and improved opportunities for
employment, professional licensing or consumer credit.” New Leaf Program, ORANGE
COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.pubdef.ocgov.com/programs/new_leaf_program/
default.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). The Alameda County Public Defender operates a
collaborative record clearing clinic with the East Bay Community Law Center. Clean Slate
Program, ALAMEDA COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/defender/
services/cleanslate.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
127
Defender Ass’n of Phila., JUV. LAW CTR., http://www.jlc.org/resources/countyresource-guide/philadelphia/defender-association-philadelphia (last visited Apr. 10, 2016);
Fresh
Start
Expungement
Clinic,
HAMILTON
COUNTY
PUB.
DEFENDER,
http://www.hamiltoncountypd.org/index.php?page=fresh-start-2 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016);
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On the civil side, record clearing services have recently proliferated in
legal aid programs, many of which are funded by the federal Legal Services
Corporation (“LSC”). Although LSC-funded programs cannot represent
clients in criminal law matters, grantees are not prohibited from handling
criminal record clearing designed to address the civil collateral consequences
of prior arrests and convictions.128 Based on the most recent data compiled
by the agency, more than two dozen record clearing legal aid programs are
operating in nineteen states.129
Community Legal Services (“CLS”) of Philadelphia is a non-LSC
funded civil legal aid program with a holistic approach to advocacy. CLS
seeks record expungement on behalf of individual clients and advocates for
systemic reform.130 In 2014, of the 1,400 people who sought help from CLS
with employment problems, over two-thirds had problems that stemmed from
their criminal records.131 CLS has also filed lawsuits against a background
check company that was reporting expunged records and against LexisNexis
for its operation of a retail theft database which contained records for many
innocent people and erected industry wide employment barriers.132
Law school clinics have also launched record clearing programs of
various kinds. At least three dozen law schools now operate such a clinic,
and many pioneered programs in their geographic areas.133 The clinics
The Civil Legal Services Division, PUB. DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
http://www.pdsdc.org/about-us/legal-services/civil-legal-services-division (last visited Apr.
10, 2016). Not all states allow public defenders to provide record clearing services. For
instance, under Illinois law, the Office of the State Appellate Defender does not have the
authority to represent a client in a petition to expunge or seal a record. See 20 Ill. Comp. State.
2630/11 (2004); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/10.6 (2003). Instead, the Office is required to provide
clients with information about the expungement process and other entities that might be able
to aid in their representation. Id.
128
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1613.1–4 (2014).
129
Legal Aid Reentry Projects for people with criminal records and other significant
barriers to employment, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono
_public_service/resources/volunteer_opportunities/reentry_projects.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2016). Not all of these programs are LSC-funded, and the list does not include LSC pro bono
projects operating in collaboration with local and state bar associations or bar foundations.
130
For example, CLS developed a model statute that would automatically seal records of
non-violent misdemeanors after ten years. See COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., ANNUAL
REPORT 2015 17, https://clsphila.org/sites/default/files/annual-reports/2015_CLS_AR.pdf
(last visited on Nov. 5, 2016). Though Pennsylvania’s legislature did not ultimately enact the
automatic sealing bill, it did recently pass a law allowing people with certain misdemeanor
convictions to petition to have those records sealed, but only if they have not been arrested or
prosecuted for ten years since the later of the relevant conviction or release from supervision.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.1 (2016).
131
See COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., supra note 130, at 17.
132
Id.
133
The March 2016 survey of law school clinical programs is on file with the authors. Of
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deliver a wide range of legal services, including record clearing and
assistance with other collateral consequences of criminal records.134 Like the
civil legal aid programs, this figure likely undercounts the field, as new
clinics are opening and other clinics may provide record clearing services
without identifying them as such. An example of one of the early law school
record clearing clinics is the East Bay Community Law Center’s Clean Slate
Clinic, which we describe in more detail in Part III.
C. FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RECORD CLEARING INTERVENTIONS

The federal government is supporting record clearing legal services
directly and indirectly through a number of related and bipartisan initiatives.
President Bush signed into law the Second Chance Act of 2007, which gives
grants to organizations providing services to people with criminal records.135
Since 2009, organizations in forty-nine states have received these grants.136
In 2010, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder convened the Federal
Interagency Reentry Council to coordinate executive branch efforts and to
promote effective policies.137 The establishment of the council was premised
on an acknowledgement of the collateral consequences of a criminal
record.138 The wide range of federal agencies and offices represented in the
council reflects both the reach of the criminal records problem and the growth
of programs being developed to address it.
all U.S. law schools surveyed (approximately 200), forty-one responded saying that they
operate clinics that clear records or provide related criminal justice remedies.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–199, 122 Stat. 657 (2007).
136
Second Chance Act Grant Program, THE NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR.,
https://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/projects/second-chance-act/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
137
The following agencies and offices have representation in the council: the Departments
of Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Education, Commerce and Veterans Affairs, the Offices of National Drug
Control Policy, Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, Personnel Management,
Management and Budget, the Social Security Administration, Domestic Policy Council, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade
Commission, Interagency Council on Homelessness, Small Business Administration, Court
Services and Offender Supervision Agency, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the
Corporation for National and Community Service.
138
Federal Interagency Reentry Council, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR.,
http://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/projects/firc/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). In 2014, Attorney
General Holder exhorted Attorneys General from every state in the nation to mitigate or
eliminate “unnecessary collateral consequences” whenever possible. Justice News: Remarks
as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric Holder at the National Association of
Attorneys General Winter Meeting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 25, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-attorney-general-eric-holdernational-association-attorneys.

SELBIN

28

1/25/18 11:13 AM

SELBIN, MCCRARY & EPSTEIN

[Vol. 108

Federal support manifests itself principally in grants that pass through a
variety of agencies. The Department of Justice administers Second Chance
Act grant funds for community organizations and specialty courts, drug
treatment diversion programs, substance-abuse programs, and career
training and mentoring.139 The Department of Labor operates the Young
Offender Reentry Demonstration Grant Program, offers employers tax
incentives to hire people with records, and provides them with liability
insurance.140 The Department of Education provides states with funds to
educate out-of-school adults, 20% of which states can dedicate to people with
criminal records.141 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
funds the Community Development Block Grant Program, through which
grantees can provide housing for people with criminal records.142 Finally,
the Department of Health and Human Services funds the Young Offender
Reentry Program and many other programs and grants that are designed to
help those struggling with substance abuse.143
In 2012, the White House and U.S. Department of Justice convened the
Legal Aid Interagency Roundtable (“LAIR”) “to raise federal agencies’
awareness of how civil legal aid can help advance a wide range of federal
objectives including improved access to health and housing, education and
employment, family stability, and community well-being.”144 According to
LAIR’s 2014 case study, civil legal aid programs should help people with
record clearing to improve their job prospects and other opportunities.145 In
139

See JAMES, supra note 14.
Id. at 19.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
The Roundtable was launched to explore how civil legal aid could advance a range of
federal objectives (including access to employment) and involved the collaboration of
seventeen federal agencies. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE HOUSE LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY
ROUNDTABLE TOOLKIT (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atj/legal-aid-interagencyroundtable-toolkit.
145
Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ACCESS TO JUST. INITIATIVE, CIVIL LEGAL AID
SUPPORTS FEDERAL EFFORTS TO HELP PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS MAKE A SUCCESSFUL
REENTRY (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atj/legacy/2014/04/16/reentrycase-study.pdf. The case study also recommends correcting inaccurate records and working
with employers to address discrimination against people with criminal records. Id. Federal
grants that support job training and mentor programs for people with criminal records at the
U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Justice now include civil legal aid as an
allowable use of funds. Id. In early 2016, the Department of Labor posted a Request for
Information about a contract for the implementation of an online National Clean Slate
Clearinghouse, which would consolidate information on currently available reentry services
and collaborate with service providers to improve their functions. Nat’l Clean Slate
Clearinghouse, FED. BUS. OPPORTUNITIES (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=
opportunity&mode=form&id=5fe5279b511aac5d4de962cc1c243f85&tab=core&_cview=0.
140
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February 2016, the LAIR released a report summarizing the results of a twoday workshop on civil legal aid.146 Among a number of research priorities,
the report recommended funding for studies of “the consequences of sealing
or expunging criminal records,” including “whether expungement improves
employment outcomes.”147
Record clearing remedies are generally available to the large number of
people with records of arrests or relatively minor infractions, misdemeanors,
and low-level felonies. Legal services providers—public defenders, civil
legal aid lawyers, and law school clinics—have developed a new
subspecialty to help people with criminal records avail themselves of these
remedies. And the federal government is devoting time, expertise, and
resources to the effort. As more resources are being devoted to criminal
record clearing, questions about its efficacy, such as the ones our study
measures, take on greater urgency.
In the next Part, we describe in some detail a community-based law
school clinic as an example of a project designed to help people with criminal
records overcome collateral consequences generally and employment
barriers in particular. The clinic served as the research site for this study.
III. A CRIMINAL RECORD CLEARING CLINIC
The East Bay Community Law Center (“EBCLC”) is a non-profit clinic
affiliated with the UC Berkeley School of Law.148 Founded by law students
in 1988, EBCLC has a dual teaching-service mission. Each year, the clinic
trains and supervises more than 100 Berkeley Law students who in turn
provide free legal assistance to several thousand low-income residents in
Alameda County, California.149
Over time, EBCLC’s services have evolved from bread and butter civil
legal aid issues like housing and welfare to a broad range of legal problems
facing low-income community members, including health, consumer,
146

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & OFF. FOR ACCESS TO JUST., WHITE HOUSE
LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY ROUNDTABLE: CIVIL LEGAL AID RESEARCH WORKSHOP REPORT
(2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249776.pdf.
147
Id. at 16.
148
Current information about EBCLC is available on the organization’s website:
http://ebclc.org/.
149
Students launched the clinic in the 1980s to increase clinical learning opportunities at
the Law School and to fill the gap left by the closure of the LSC-funded neighborhood legal
aid office in Berkeley. For published accounts of EBCLC’s history, see Angela P. Harris,
Margaretta Lin & Jeffrey Selbin, From ‘The Art of War’ to ‘Being Peace’: Mindfulness and
Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2073, 2093 (2007); Jeffrey Selbin
& Mark Del Monte, A Waiting Room of Their Own: The Family Care Network as a Model for
Providing Gender-Specific Legal Services to Women with HIV, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
103, 120 (1998).
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immigration, and community economic development. In 2001, an EBCLC
lawyer and her students recognized the growing collateral consequences of
mass criminalization in the client community. They started a project to assist
people who were cycling in and out of the criminal justice system without
legal help. For example, they represented homeless people charged with
infractions and misdemeanors in traffic court.
These early interventions revealed the need for a general record clearing
practice, as client after client appeared to be held back from jobs and other
opportunities based on criminal records for relatively minor offenses. After
piloting the provision of such services, EBCLC launched the Clean Slate
Clinic at a 2005 public summit and record clearing event co-sponsored by
U.S. Congresswoman Barbara Lee. More than 900 people with criminal
records attended the event.150 The clinic began assisting people with a range
of record remedies, including dismissals, felony reductions, certificates of
rehabilitation, and pardons.151 Since the 2005 launch, the clinic has trained
more than 150 law students and served almost 10,000 clients.152
In this Part, we describe the Clean Slate Clinic’s service goals and
methods, the local client population, and California’s main record clearing
remedies.153 In light of earlier descriptions of the emerging field in public
defender programs, civil legal aid offices, and law school clinics, we discuss
how EBCLC’s intervention model at the time of the study was generally
representative of criminal record clearing programs.
A. GOALS AND METHODS

EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic was one of the first law school clinics to
provide criminal record clearing legal services. Since its formal launch in
2005, the clinic has been animated by two distinct but related goals. As
described above, research confirms that people with criminal records face
significant barriers to jobs, education, housing, and civic participation. The
first and primary goal of the clinic is to increase access to employment and
other opportunities. Our study measures the employment outcomes of the
record clearing intervention.
Second, the criminal justice system exacts a heavy psychosocial toll on
150
Clean Slate, E. BAY CMTY. L. CTR., http://ebclc.org/about/the-work/economicsecurity-opportunity/clean-slate/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
151
Clean Slate @ 10: Supporting Successful Reentry Then and Now, E. BAY CMTY. L.
CTR., http://ebclc.org/support-us/campaigns/clean-slate-10/then-and-now/ (last visited Oct.
23, 2016).
152
Id.
153
Interview with Eliza Hersh, EBCLC Clean Slate Clinic Director, in Berkeley, Cal.
(Dec. 11, 2015) (providing much of the information in this section about the clinic).
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participants, forcing them to undergo various forms of status degradation that
undermine their human dignity.154 These rituals strip people’s self-esteem
and individuality, relegating them to the status of criminals. By providing
record clearing services, the clinic aims to reduce the social stigma and
psychological harms associated with involvement in the criminal justice
system.155 This goal is the subject of a companion study not discussed further
here.156
To achieve these opportunity-increasing and dignity-enhancing goals,
the clinic has developed a multi-modal service delivery model that includes
community outreach and education, law reform litigation, and policy
advocacy. The clinic’s outreach and education work involves staffing
community-based workshops and weekend events for people with criminal
records, and training for stakeholders, such as workforce development
partners, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies. The clinic also
trains other legal services providers, including public defender offices and
community agencies. In collaboration with partner organizations, the clinic
engages in policy advocacy and impact litigation to expand the rights of and
protections for people with criminal records and to reduce the collateral
consequences of criminal records.157
The heart of the clinic’s delivery model—which informs all other
aspects—is direct representation of people with criminal records, which we
describe in the following subsections.

154
See Harold Garfinkle, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J.
SOC. 420 (1956) (describing punishment as a “status degradation ceremony” that places
criminality at the center of the punished person’s identity); Shadd Maruna, Reentry as a Rite
of Passage, 13 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 3, 11 (2011) (theorizing that Anglo-American cultures
are particularly bad at welcoming people who have been convicted of criminal offenses back
into society because they lack needed reintegration rituals); see also Amy Myrick, Facing
Your Criminal Record: Expungement and the Collateral Problem of Wrongfully Represented
Self, 47 L. & SOC’Y 73, 102 (2013) (finding that people who encounter their criminal records
in the record clearing process often discover that their record is a static and inaccurate
depiction of their identities).
155
See Maruna, supra note 154, at 14 (arguing that reintegration rituals can have the
emotional and symbolic significance necessary to facilitate healing).
156
In the companion study, one of the authors is measuring the status enhancing benefits
of the record clearing intervention, with a particular focus on the role of the record clearing
process. Keramet Reiter et al., Redemption Song: The Qualitative Impact of Reentry Legal
Services and Status Enhancement Rituals on People with Criminal Records (July 21, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
157
For example, the clinic has participated in campaigns to increase civic engagement for
voters and jurors, foster juvenile reentry, and rationalize licensing requirements for people
with criminal records. Interview with Eliza Hersh, supra note 153.
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B. CLIENTS AND REMEDIES

The Clean Slate Clinic serves clients in Alameda County, California,
which is home to more than 1.6 million people.158 The county seat and largest
city is Oakland, and the county is one of the most racially diverse in the
country.159 The cities and communities within Alameda County are
heterogeneous, with pockets of great wealth and deep poverty. In 2015, one
in eight county residents lived in poverty, which is below the state average,
but poorer areas of the County have disproportionately high rates of
unemployment, especially among African-Americans.160
Like their counterparts in communities around California and across the
country, Alameda County residents have high rates of involvement with the
criminal justice system. From 2005 through 2014, an average of 33,812
people were arrested annually for misdemeanor offenses and roughly one
third of arrestees were African-American.161 Many people arrested for
misdemeanors end up on informal court probation—Alameda County’s
Probation Department estimated that about 41,000 people were on such
probation in 2013.162 Overall, local nonprofits estimate that roughly 375,000
Alameda County adults have a criminal record.163
158
QuickFacts:
Alameda
County,
California,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/06001,00 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
159
The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2015, the county was 51.3% White, 29.5%
Asian, 11.8% African-American, 1.1% American Indian and Native Alaskan, 1% Native
Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, and 5.3% multi-racial. Id. Further, 22.6% of people identified
as being Hispanic or Latino—a category that the Census treats as non-racial. Id.
160
Id. Though the unemployment rate in Alameda County is currently down to 4.3%, it
is much higher in poorer, largely African-American areas of the county. See Chris Roberts,
Report: Black unemployment in Bay Area more than three times the average, EXAMINER (Mar.
6, 2015), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/report-black-unemployment-in-bayarea-more-than-three-times-the-average/Content?oid=2922602
(stating
that
the
unemployment rate for African-Americans in the Bay Area was 19%, which was three times
the average unemployment rate of other races); see also Alameda County Profile, ST. OF CAL.
EMP. DEV. DEP’T, http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/cgi/databrowsing/localareaprofile
qsresults.asp?selectdarea=Alameda+County&selectedindex=1&menuchoice=localarea
pro&state=true&geogarea=0604000001&countyname= (last visited Oct. 23, 2016); Economic
Development
&
Jobs,
YOUTH UPRISING,
http://www.youthuprising.org/issuesresponses/economic-development-jobs/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (stating that in East
Oakland, unemployment rates exceed 50% in some areas).
161
County Map, OPEN JUST., https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/agencies/county-map (filtered
by “all arrests”) (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).
162
ALAMEDA CTY. PROB. DEP’T, ROAD TO RE-ENTRY: ALAMEDA COUNTY ADULT REENTRY STRATEGIC PLAN 10 (2014), https://www.acgov.org/probation/documents/ReEntry
StrategicPlan-BoardApproved3-11-14.pdf. Alameda County’s Probation Department also has
data on people who have been convicted of more serious crimes—as of July of 2013, there
were 12,390 people on felony probation (5,270 of whom required supervision), 1,860 people
on state parole, and 500 people on federal probation. Id.
163
Sam Levin, East Bay Businesses That Give Applicants a Fair Chance, E. BAY EXPRESS
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People seeking record clearing services in the Clean Slate Clinic fall into
several broad, overlapping categories.164 Some people have an arrest or
conviction for a single bad moment, like petty theft, a bar fight, public
drunkenness, or a DUI. Some have a string of arrests and convictions related
to substance addiction (and supporting the addiction), such as non-violent
drug and alcohol offenses, property offenses like shoplifting, or prostitution.
Women, in particular, might have a welfare fraud conviction for failure
to report income or to repay an overpayment. Young men, in particular,
might have records with vehicle-related arrests and convictions for offenses
like driving on a suspended license, failure to appear (on traffic tickets), or
joyriding. According to advocates, these convictions tend to cascade, in part
because of the employment barriers for people with criminal records.
In light of these community demographics and needs, the Clean Slate
Clinic assists people seeking two kinds of record clearing remedies. The first
remedy is a post-conviction set-aside and dismissal for convictions that did
not result in prison sentences.165 The second remedy is a felony reduction.166
1. Set Aside and Dismissal
Under the California Penal Code, people convicted of certain
infractions, misdemeanors, or felonies that did not result in a state prison
sentence can petition the court to set aside and dismiss the convictions.167
Dismissal petitions fall into mandatory and discretionary categories. The
court must grant the dismissal petition if probation is completed (including
payment of all fines, fees, and restitution), the petitioner is not serving
another sentence (or on probation), and the petitioner has no charges pending
in another case.168 Under certain circumstances, where all probation terms

(June 10, 2015), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/east-bay-businesses-that-giveapplicants-a-fair-chance/Content?oid=4330428.
164
Clean Slate Clinic Director Eliza Hersh provided general background information
about the clinic’s clients. Interview with Eliza Hersh, Director of EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic,
in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 7, 2016).
165
Set-aside and dismissal remedies require either that no probation was imposed, that
probation has been completed, or that early termination of probation has been obtained under
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.41 (West 2017).
166
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 2011).
167
These remedies are codified in California Penal Code sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, and
1203.41. While these sections differ slightly in eligibility requirements and impact, we will
refer to this relief generally as dismissals. Certain misdemeanor and felony sexual offenses do
not qualify, and neither do infractions. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.41 (2017).
168
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1); id. at § 1203.4(a) (petitioners with convictions
who never received probation are also eligible for dismissals if: (1) the conviction is a
misdemeanor or an infraction; (2) it has been at least one year since the date of conviction;
and (3) the petitioner complied fully with the sentence of the court, is not currently serving
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have not been completed, the court still has discretion to set aside and dismiss
a conviction.169
Although the dismissal remedy is often referred to as “expungement,” it
does not result in the destruction of the criminal record. Instead, the dismissal
releases the person “from all penalties and disabilities” resulting from the
conviction.170 The dismissal is supposed to be entered into the criminal
record and reflected on state and federal RAP sheets, enabling the successful
petitioner to answer “no” to an inquiry about conviction history on
applications for most private employment.171 Some dismissals, however, will
another sentence, not currently charged with another offense, and has obeyed the law and lived
an honest and upright life since the time of conviction, or in the interests of justice); id. at
§ 1203.41 (petitioners convicted pursuant to section 1170(h) are eligible for dismissals if: (1)
the concluding portion of petitioner’s sentence was suspended under section 1170(h)(5); (2) it
has been a year or two, depending on the type of felony conviction, since completion of the
sentence; and (3) the petitioner is not currently incarcerated, under supervision, or charged
with a new offense).
169
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1) (for convictions where the petitioner received
probation but did not get an early release, did not fulfill all the conditions of probation, and
was not convicted of any offense listed in the Vehicle Code sections 12810(a)–(e), but: (1)
paid all the fines, restitution, and reimbursements ordered by the court as part of the sentence;
and (2) is not currently charged with, on probation for, or serving a sentence for any other
offense).
170
Id. However, California legislators and courts have limited the scope of this release
from disabilities. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788(c) (West 2005) (mandating that dismissal of a
conviction under section 1203.4 does not prevent a defendant from being impeached with the
conviction if he takes the stand in his own defense in a subsequent criminal trial); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 290.007 (West 2012) (stating that a dismissal under § 1203.4 does not eliminate the
requirement to register for a sex offense); id. at § 299(f) (requiring a person found guilty of a
qualifying offense to provide specimens, samples, or prints even if the offense was dismissed
under 1203.4); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13555 (West 2017) (providing that dismissal under 1203.4
does not affect any revocation or suspension of driver’s privileges); Brownrigg v. U.S.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 356 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that a
conviction under 1203.4 does not prohibit the federal government from examining the
conviction for immigration purposes); People v. Frawley, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 559–60 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that a dismissal “does not, properly speaking, ‘expunge’ the prior
conviction . . .” and that the relief a dismissal provides has substantial limits, as it cannot
prevent the “dismissed” crime from being used as a prior conviction, relieve the beneficiary
of the obligation to disclose the dismissed conviction in an application for a professional
license, or reinstate the right to possess firearms); People v. Diaz, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 255
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a conviction dismissed under 1203.4 could still be
considered a “strike”); People v. Majado, 70 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937)
(holding that a 1203.4 expungement does not prevent the use of a prior conviction from being
admitted as a “similar” offense in subsequent prosecution).
171
Danielle Jones, When the Fallout of Criminal Conviction Goes Too Far: Challenging
Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 237, 255 (2015). The right to say no is not
in the statute; the California Labor Code forbids an employer from asking about a dismissed
conviction, with exceptions for a number of public positions. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West
2017). The California Penal Code specifies the conditions under which dismissed convictions
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show up in subsequent prosecutions and must be disclosed on a questionnaire
in an application for licensure or public office.172 Because more than 20% of
California’s 19 million workers require a license—and California has
particularly onerous licensing requirements for jobs typically held by people
of modest means173—the dismissal remedy on its face does not eliminate
barriers to all forms of employment.
2. Felony Reduction
Under California Penal Code section 17(b), people convicted of certain
felonies and not sentenced to state prison may be eligible to reduce the felony
to a misdemeanor.174 Felony reduction applies only to convictions for crimes
that could have been charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor and only if
all felony charges in the same case are eligible.175 Factors the judge considers
in granting felony reductions include the nature and seriousness of the
offense, the defendant’s attitude toward the crime that has been committed,

must still be disclosed, including “in response to any direct question contained in any
questionnaire or application for public office, for licensure by any state or local agency, or for
contracting with the California State Lottery Commission.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1).
Under the legal principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, people are not required to
disclose dismissed convictions to private employers. See People v. Arata, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d
160, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that dismissal under 1203.4 allows a defendant to
“truthfully represent to friends, acquaintances and private sector employers that he has no
conviction” (quoting People v. Acuna, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000))).
172
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1). Dismissals under § 1203.4 also do not exempt
people required by law to register as sex offenders from doing so. People v. Hamdon, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 95, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the sex registration requirement was not a
penalty or disability under 1203.4 because the primary purpose of the requirement was to
ensure public safety). Dismissals under 1203.4 also do not, in general, undo the consequences
of conviction for the purpose of immigration proceedings. Ramirez-Castro v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 287 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the general rule is
that state law expungements do not affect the immigration consequences of a conviction). But
see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 480(c) (West 2015) (mandating, after recent amendment, that
a licensing board may not deny a person a license “solely on the basis of a conviction that has
been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4, 1203.4a, or 1203.41 of the Penal Code.”).
173
See generally Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies,
HAMILTON PROJECT 9 (Jan. 2015), available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/
reforming_occupational_licensing_policies. Although California does not have as high a
percentage of workers in licensed professions as many other states, it is the third most
restrictive state behind only Louisiana and Arizona in licensing requirements “for occupations
traditionally entered into by people of modest means . . . defined by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics as making less than the national average income.” LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, JOBS
FOR CALIFORNIANS: STRATEGIES TO EASE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BARRIERS 15–16 (Oct.
2016), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/sites/lhc.ca.gov/files/Reports/234/Report234.pdf.
174
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b), § 19.8.
175
Id. at § 17(b).
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and his or her behavior during the trial.176
Felony reductions are an important remedy for a couple of reasons.
Because some employers ask only about felony convictions, the reduction to
a misdemeanor allows a person to answer “no” when asked about such
convictions even if they have not obtained full dismissal of the conviction.177
A felony reduction can also restore an individual’s right to serve on a jury
and to possess a firearm.178
Despite these benefits, the felony reduction remedy is also limited in
important ways. A felony reduction is not retroactive and does not mitigate
all of the collateral consequences of the newly created misdemeanor record.
Some licensing laws expressly limit the impact of felony reduction. Further,
despite the reduction, the physical record of the original designation of a
felony conviction is not expunged or erased from court and law enforcement
records. Rather, the reduction or reclassification is listed along with the
felony as a subsequent disposition.
C. RECORD CLEARING PROCESS

To seek the record clearing remedies described above, legal service
providers generally obtain a client’s RAP sheet, which should be a complete
record of adult involvement in the criminal justice system. Advocates review
RAP sheets for accuracy and jurisdiction and to check eligibility for a
dismissal, felony reduction, or other record clearing remedy. Next, they
prepare a formal petition for all eligible remedies.179 In addition to the
petition, advocates advise and assist the client to obtain supporting
documentation in the form of letters, declarations, and other testimonials, or
evidence demonstrating rehabilitation and the need for the requested relief.
As needed, advocates represent petitioners in court to pursue available
176

People v. Superior Court, 928 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Cal. 1997).
Jones, supra note 171, at 255.
178
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (stating that when a crime meets all of the relevant
conditions, it is a misdemeanor “for all purposes”); id. at § 203(a)(5) (excluding people
convicted of felonies from serving as trial jurors unless their civil rights have been restored);
id. at § 29800 (making it a felony offense to own, purchase, receive, or possess a firearm after
one has been convicted of a felony).
179
For dismissal of records under Penal Code sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, and felony
reductions under Penal Code section 17b, the form is “CR-180,” available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/cr180.pdf. The Clean Slate Clinic occasionally serves
clients with convictions eligible for dismissal or reduction even if they have other convictions
that are not eligible for relief. This typically happens if clients have newer convictions eligible
for relief and older convictions that are ineligible for relief but which should not be reported
to employers because they occurred more than seven years ago. E-mail from Eliza Hersh, Dir.
of EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic, to Jeffrey Selbin, Clinical Professor of Law, UC Berkeley
School of Law (Jan. 30, 2017) (on file with author).
177
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remedies.
While record clearing programs vary across states and within
jurisdictions, EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic is a fairly representative example
of the growing field in public defender offices, civil legal aid programs, and
law school clinics. Like the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office and
Community Legal Services of Philadelphia described above, the Clean Slate
Clinic is a high volume provider that focuses services on people who are
disproportionately impacted by criminal records. And like the others, the
clinic helps clients avail themselves of core record clearing remedies.
The Clean Slate Clinic, therefore, was an appropriate setting in which to
study the record clearing intervention. In fact, there is a growing movement
to evaluate outcomes in civil legal aid programs, where client demand far
outstrips scarce resources, and providers and funders need better data to make
key resource allocation decisions.180 Law school clinics affiliated with
research universities are obvious sites of inquiry with access to the requisite
expertise to mount meaningful research protocols.181
In the next Part, we describe our study, including its method, population
sample, and limits.
IV. A CRIMINAL RECORD CLEARING STUDY
As described above, tens of millions of American adults have a criminal
record of arrest or prosecution, mostly for relatively minor offenses. These
records serve as barriers to a range of benefits and opportunities, especially
in the labor market. Record clearing programs like the East Bay Community
Law Center’s Clean Slate Clinic are designed to improve employment
outcomes for people with criminal records, but we know surprisingly little
about if, how, and for whom these interventions deliver on their promise.
Some record clearing programs have conducted outcome evaluations.182
180

Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for
Improving Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2232–34 (2013); Jeffrey Selbin et
al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and
the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 54–61 (2012) [hereinafter Selbin et al.,
Resource Allocation and Access to Justice]; Jeffrey Selbin et al., Access to Evidence: How an
Evidence-Based Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aid for Low- and Moderate-Income
Americans, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2011), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civilliberties/report/2011/06/22/9707/access-to-evidence/.
181
Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 145, 162
(2013); Jeffrey Selbin & Jeanne Charn, Legal Aid, Law School Clinics and the Opportunity
for Joint Gain, MGMT. INFO. EXCH. J. 28, 29–31 (2007).
182
For example, an outside review of the San Francisco Public Defender Office’s Clean
Slate Program found that 90% of clients’ petitions (mostly dismissals and felony reductions)
were granted, removing “significant barriers for Clean Slate clients to employment, housing,
public benefits, civic participation, immigration, and the attainment of other social, legal, and
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EBCLC, for example, evaluates its Clean Slate Clinic through a variety of
methods, including client satisfaction surveys and client focus groups.183
While record clearing programs appear to be providing important services to
their clients, the research to date does not tell us much about the relationship
between the intervention and employment outcomes.184
Our study attempts to help fill this void. We measured Clean Slate
Clinic participants’ average employment rates and earnings reported to the
Social Security Administration before and after record clearing, using a wellestablished method frequently deployed to study the effect of job-training
programs on employment outcomes.185 By doing so, we hoped to answer
some basic questions about the impact of the record clearing intervention on
employment outcomes.
In this Part, we describe our research design, which is observational in
nature and compares early adopters of the record clearing intervention to late
adopters. We also describe our sample subjects, our data source, and the
limits of our method, population, and data.
A. METHOD

The goal in studying the effect of a program intervention is to measure
the difference between two otherwise identical people: one who participates
in the intervention and one who does not. Our study is retrospective and
observational, using a timeframe research design—in this case, early
personal goals.” LFA GRP., CLEAN SLATE PROGRAM OFF. OF THE PUB. DEFENDER CITY &
COUNTY OF S.F., 2007–2008 EVALUATION FINDINGS 6 (2009), http://sfpublicdefender.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2009/05/clean-slate-evaluation-final-report.pdf. A Stanford costbenefit analysis of a record clearing program in Santa Clara County found that former clients
who received a dismissal reported to the provider an increase in annual income of $6,190.
MEYLI CHAPIN ET AL., A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL RECORD EXPUNGEMENT IN
SANTA CLARA COUNTY 23 (March 2014), available at https://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/
publications/cost-benefit-analysis-criminal-record-expungement-santa-clara-county.
183
A review of several hundred survey forms and three focus group reports reveals a high
level of client satisfaction with both the service and outcomes. See Reiter et al., supra note
156.
184
The San Francisco Public Defender Office study equates a successful process outcome
(a petition granted) with the desired outcome measure (removing barriers to employment and
other opportunities). LFA GRP., supra note 182. The Stanford Santa Clara study does not
control for key variables, including selection effects, which makes it impossible to draw a
causal inference between the intervention and the reported outcome. CHAPIN ET AL., supra
note 182. EBCLC’s program evaluation focuses primarily on client satisfaction. See Reiter et
al., supra note 156.
185
See Orley Ashenfelter, Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings, 60
REV. ECON. & STAT. 47, 48 (1978) (a study using Social Security Administration (“SSA”) data
to determine the effect of job training programs on earnings, assuming that the SSA’s data are
an accurate reflection of earning potential over time, but noting that the records are capped at
the Social Security taxable maximum, a fact that is less relevant for low-income workers).
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adopters versus late adopters—to measure the impact of the Clean Slate
Clinic’s record clearing intervention on employment outcomes. For reasons
described in more detail in Appendix A, we did not use other methods, such
as a randomized controlled trial or a match group, which have different
strengths and weaknesses than our approach.
Our early-versus-late adopters approach makes comparisons between
groups of participants that are organized according to when they began the
intervention. If the intervention has an effect, then the effect should appear
in the order in which the intervention was received. Thus, a group that has
yet to begin the intervention can serve as a comparison group for the group
that has already begun the intervention.
As compared with other methodologies drawing upon other types of
comparison groups, our approach has two important advantages. First, the
employment outcomes are uniform—our comparison groups are all
eventually served and we have participants’ social security numbers, so we
can measure their average employment rates and earnings in an apples-toapples way. This alleviates some of our concerns about internal validity.
Second, the participants come from a common economic environment and
are otherwise similarly situated (except for the date they sought the
intervention). This alleviates some concerns about external validity.
However, to measure the effect of the intervention using this model, we
must account for pre-intervention differences between the people in the
temporally divided groups. In order to do this, we use pre-intervention data
on the outcomes that the study will measure (in our case, employment rates
and average earnings). Any differences in these measures between the
temporally divided groups before the intervention takes place are attributable
to selection bias and cannot logically be attributed to the intervention
(because it has not yet occurred).
Having established the average differences between the groups of
participants prior to the intervention, this method assumes that these
differences remain constant (or time-invariant). The impact of the
intervention can then be measured by taking the difference between the
change in the first group’s employment rates and earnings before and after
the intervention and the change over the same period in any of the
comparison groups’ employment rates and earnings, which have not yet been
affected by the intervention. This method, which is sometimes called
“difference-in-differences,”186 effectively extracts the effects of pre-study
differences between participants, thus leaving the impact of the intervention.
186

See generally James Heckman et al., Sources of Selection Bias in Evaluating Social
Programs: An Interpretation of Conventional Measures and Evidence on the Effectiveness of
Matching as a Program Evaluation Method, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 13416 (1996).
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For more detail on our method, validity, hypotheses and modeling about
how the record clearing intervention might impact employment rates and
earnings, see Appendix B.
B. SAMPLE

We drew our sample from clients served by the East Bay Community
Law Center’s Clean Slate Clinic. The clinic serves 1,000 or more clients a
year with a variety of criminal record clearing matters. For individual
participants (clients), the clinic provides assistance, including referrals,
counsel and advice, brief service, and full representation. In consultation
with Clean Slate Clinic lawyers, we had to make choices about which case
types and forms of intervention to include in our study.
The subjects in our study represent a random sample of just over 10%
(264/2,575) of the people who received legal assistance in the clinic during
the twenty-four-month period from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2009.187
Participants were eligible for inclusion in the subject pool if they received
representation from the clinic—not just a referral or counsel and advice—to
obtain at least one of the principal California record clearing remedies
described above (the dismissal of a criminal record and/or a felony
reduction).
Working with EBCLC staff, we obtained basic client
demographic data on the total pool of eligible clients and the sample group
from an electronic case management system and paper case files.188
From the batch of 264 clients, we requested aggregate, anonymized,
annual employment rate and earnings data from the Social Security
Administration Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics (“SSA”). We
received such data for 235 people, including 147 men and eighty-eight
women. We did not receive data for the twenty-nine clients whose social
security numbers and dates of birth did not match the SSA records. The SSA
data cover a period that begins in 2000, well before the record clearing
intervention, and ends in 2011, two to four years after the intervention.189
187

The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the University of California,
Berkeley Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects.
188
We identified an initial sample of 364 participants, or roughly one in eight participants
during the two-year period. We selected clients served within the time period by relative
prevalence of their last name, beginning with each letter of the alphabet. This weighted
randomization procedure accorded with EBCLC’s practice of keeping files alphabetized by
last initial for each year. We did not initially exclude participants based on the presence or
absence of a social security number in the file. However, after reviewing the paper files of the
364 participants in the original sample, we reduced our sample to the 264 clients who had
sufficient identifying information to obtain employment rate and earnings data from the Social
Security Administration (a single social security number and date of birth).
189
As noted above, we are awaiting updated data through 2015 from the SSA.
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Table 1 displays statistics for the four cohorts we studied.
Table 1. Statistics by Cohort Sample
Timing of
Service

N

Fraction
Female

1

2007h2

28

0.43

40.2

0.75

0.69

$16,738

$15,064

2

2008h1

85

0.33

38.6

0.76

0.74

22,106

18,875

3

2008h2

55

0.25

41.2

0.75

0.67

15,428

14,042

4

2009h1

67

0.51

43.6

0.76

0.69

20,427

15,335

235

0.37

40.8

0.75

0.70

$19,425

$16,280

Cohort

All

Average
Age

Fraction Employed
2000-06 2007-11

Average Real Earnings
2000-06
2007-11

Notes: Statistics based on SSA data. Average real earnings deflated using Bay Area CPI-U from BLS.
Denominator for average real earnings is all participants (not only those with positive earnings). Fraction
employed is the percent of participants with positive earnings.

The first cohort was served in the second half of 2007 (July 1 to
December 31, 2007), the second cohort was served in the first half of 2008
(January 1 to June 30, 2008), the third cohort was served in the second half
of 2008 (July 1 to December 31, 2008), and the fourth cohort was served in
the first half of 2009 (January 1 to June 30, 2009). The cohorts range in size
from twenty-eight participants (Cohort 1) to eighty-five participants (Cohort
2).
The four cohorts are somewhat heterogeneous with respect to timeinvariant (constant) characteristics. The fraction of the cohort that is female
ranges from a quarter (Cohort 3) to just over a half (Cohort 4), with an
average across the cohorts of 37%. Average age also varies across cohort
from thirty-eight years (Cohort 2) to forty-three years (Cohort 4), but
averages just over forty years. Although we know that 57% of the clients in
our original sample were African-American, our cohort sizes were too small
to obtain race and ethnicity from SSA while adhering to its requirements of
anonymized data.190
Clean Slate participants are working—two-thirds to three-quarters are
employed in the formal sector—but they have very low average earnings,
generally around $18,000 in 2015 dollars (adjusted for inflation across the
entire study period).191 This measure of formal earnings is an average across
190
The quality of SSA’s race and ethnicity data is notoriously unreliable for a variety of
reasons. See Patricia P. Martin, Why Researchers Now Rely on Surveys for Race Data on
OASDI and SSI Programs: A Comparison of Four Major Surveys, SOC. SEC. OFF. OF RET. &
DISABILITY POL’Y (Jan. 2016), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2016-01.html.
191
SSA earnings data are nominal (not adjusted for inflation). To compare changes over
time, we convert nominal earnings to real earnings (adjusted for inflation) using data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics on the Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers for San
Francisco-Oakland-San Jose. This is the narrowest geography for which information on price
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all program participants—even those with zero earnings. The purpose of
using this type of average, as opposed to one limited to the subset of those
working, is that one potential mechanism by which the record clearing
intervention might improve labor market outcomes for participants is by
increasing their chances of formal employment. In such a context, average
earnings across all program participants is the cleanest measure of labor
market success.
The average employment rates and earnings mask some variation across
cohorts and time, as the numbers in Table 1 show. The fraction employed—
here measured as the fraction of participants with positive formal earnings—
was 75% or 76% for each cohort in the 2000-2006 period. In the 2007-2011
period, the fraction employed was down five percentage points on average
across cohorts to around 70%, with variations ranging from 67% in Cohort 3
to 74% in Cohort 2.
In terms of earnings, Cohorts 1 and 3 have lower averages than Cohorts
2 and 4, closer to $15,000 than $20,000. Not surprisingly, average earnings
in all cohorts were higher in years before the great recession than after.
Across cohorts, average earnings in 2000-2006 were over $19,000 and fell to
just over $16,000 in 2007-2011.
Figures 1A and 1B explore the temporal dimension of these patterns in
greater detail, contrasting our sample of participants with labor market
outcomes for Alameda County more generally.192
Figure 1A presents the time series of employment to population ratios,
or the ratio of people working to the total population, for our sample of Clean
Slate participants and for Alameda County as a whole.

levels is available. All figures cited in the paper are in 2015 dollars. Consumer Price Index,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2017).
192
In Figures 1A and 1B, we use the population of those aged eighteen to sixty-five, even
though many of those people are not in the labor force.
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The level of employment (measured as fraction employed) in our
sample is similar to that of the general population and the overall trajectories
of those levels are also highly similar. That may be prior grounds for
suspecting that the levels and trends would be dissimilar—after all, Clean
Slate participants self-select a treatment indicating an interest in work
(although they struggle to obtain it), while it is possible that Alameda County
residents as a whole are less interested in work (yet may have an easier time
obtaining it). Nonetheless, the year-to-year fluctuations in the two series are
very similar.193
Figure 1B presents the time series of average real earnings.

193

The time series correlation of the two is over 0.90. In the interest of transparency,
Appendix Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix C provide a graphical display of the raw data on
employment rates and earnings that we obtained from the SSA. These data are a time series
for each of the Clean Slate cohorts.
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Each solid circle is the weighted average of real earnings across the four
cohorts, with weights equal to the size of the cohort. In the wake of the early
2000s recession, participant earnings fell about $2,000 in 2015 dollars, from
roughly $20,000 to $18,000. Earnings increased over $4,000 leading up to
the great recession, but plummeted from 2006 to 2009, falling from over
$22,000 to just over $14,000, before rebounding slightly in 2010 and 2011.
While average real earnings for our sample of participants are extremely
low relative to all residents of Alameda County, the trends are generally
similar.194 The earnings levels are so different that placing the two series on
the same axis would mask fluctuation over time, so we present our sample of
Clean Slate participants on the left-hand y-axis and Alameda County
residents on the right-hand y-axis. Earnings for Alameda County residents
in 2000 were roughly $48,000 in 2015 dollars, suggesting that the earnings
power of Clean Slate participants is about 40 percent of the earnings of all

194
To obtain a measure of earnings akin to average real earnings based on SSA data, we
use Bureau of Labor Statistics data drawn from the Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (QCEW) program. This program covers approximately 98% of formal sector earnings
and, like the SSA data, is based off of W2 forms filed by individuals and employers. We take
total earnings from the QCEW for Alameda County (the most granular geography
corresponding to EBCLC) and normalize it by estimated population ages eighteen to sixtyfive. We do so using straight line interpolation between total population on Census Day 2000
and 2010, further discounted by the 25% and 10% of Alameda that was below age eighteen
and above age sixty-five, respectively. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cew/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2017).
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residents.195
Presenting the data this way allows us to see that the earnings power of
Alameda County residents and of Clean Slate participants exhibit similar
patterns over time.196 But in the wake of the great recession, real earnings
outcomes for Clean Slate participants worsened much more rapidly and
sharply than earnings for all county residents, underscoring the fragile labor
market for workers with criminal records. Clean Slate participants and
county residents experienced a small improvement in the labor market in
2010 and 2011.
C. LIMITS

As described above, the early-versus-late adopters study design is a
standard econometric methodology used to analyze non-randomized
programs.197 We use the design here because of our interest in labor market
outcomes for people with criminal records. But we also are taking advantage
of access to client information through a law school-affiliated, communitybased clinic and the availability of SSA earnings and employment rate data.
Nevertheless, we make several assumptions that influence our findings.
First, the study methodology is observational rather than experimental,
meaning that the underlying model has the potential to affect the substantive
conclusions. In particular, one key modelling assumption allowing for
unbiased estimation of program effects is that, controlling for the influences
of the overall Bay Area economy, the date on which EBCLC clients avail
themselves of EBCLC services is random. This assumption can be
understood as implying that, conditional on other controls, simple knowledge
of the date clients arrive at EBCLC tells us nothing about their future
employment rates and earnings. As we discuss below, our findings are
somewhat at odds with this assumption and are more consistent with what is
known in the labor economics literature as an “Ashenfelter dip.”198
Second, we assume that EBCLC’s intervention at the time was broadly
representative of other record clearing programs in the field. We have
described above why we think this assumption is a reasonable one, but the
Clean Slate Clinic could be different in any number of ways from other
programs. The active participation of student advocates may impact
195

Because Clean Slate participants are substantially more likely to be in the labor market
than all Alameda residents aged eighteen to sixty-five, their average real earnings are in reality
even lower than 40% of the real earnings of all County residents.
196
The time series correlation of the two is just below 0.81.
197
See Louis S. Jacobson et al., Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 685, 692–95 (1993).
198
See generally Ashenfelter, supra note 185, infra note 246, and accompanying text.
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outcomes (for better or worse), though this would presumably be true in other
clinical programs (but perhaps not in public defender and civil legal aid
offices).199 Choices about which clients to serve and the scope of services to
provide introduce a range of selection effects on the provider side that are
difficult to control for and generalize about.
In addition, record clearing and fair hiring laws vary considerably by
state. Even within jurisdictions, their application can differ by courthouse
and judge. We also have no way of knowing whether the intervention is more
or less effective in a rising or falling labor market, much less how it operates
relative to different local hiring practices.
In the next Part, we describe our findings and consider their implications
for policy and research.
V. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
Our research design takes advantage of the staggered timing of the
Clean Slate Clinic intervention to measure its effects on participants’ average
employment rates and real earnings. Though the study has limits, described
above, we found that: (1) the record clearing intervention appears to boost
both average employment rates and real earnings, though the durability of
these increases is not yet known; and (2) participants sought the record
clearing remedy after a period of suppressed earnings, in spite of relatively
active and stable employment rates.
In this Part, we review the findings in more detail, and we discuss their
implications for record clearing policy and research.
A. FINDINGS

As previously noted, there is some heterogeneity in our sample. For
example, different cohorts of Clean Slate participants have different gender
composition and different employment rates, earnings, and trajectories.
There is also substantial variation in labor market outcomes over time, and
these year-to-year changes are not necessarily common to all cohorts.
Because Clean Slate participants receive services at different times, however,
199

See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use)
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2124 (2012) (considering the role of student advocates in finding
that a law school clinic’s offer of representation to claimants in unemployment insurance
appeals hearings had no statistically significant impact on the chance that claimants would
prevail in their appeals, although such offers did delay proceedings); Sponsor Preferences,
EQUAL JUST. WORKS, http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/post-grad/equal-justice-worksfellowships/apply/sponsorship (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). Record clearing programs in some
public defender offices are staffed by paralegals and law student interns, and the Equal Justice
Works record clearing fellowship program is staffed with recent law graduates.
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temporal differences and program effects are distinguishable.200
We observed four cohorts for a dozen years, 2000 to 2011 inclusive and
so had forty-eight data points corresponding to our 235 Clean Slate Clinic
participants. The econometric method we employed was a weighted
multivariate regression that sought to apportion explanatory credit among
time-invariant cohort differences (fixed characteristics of the participants
unrelated to the intervention), cohort-invariant time differences (changes in
the larger economy), and program effects (the impact of the record clearing
intervention on employment outcomes). In equation form, the specific
regression model we employed can be written as:
Equation 1
+

)

𝑌"# = 𝜇" + 𝜆# +

𝜃) 𝐷"# + 𝜀"#
),-.

The regression uses weights proportional to cohort size, which is
appropriate for this context. Using a weighted regression replicates what
would be obtained from an individual-level regression in which we imputed
to that individual the cohort-specific outcome. We explain the regression
model in more detail in Appendix D.

200

See generally Jacobson et al., supra note 197, at 692–95.
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1. Average Employment Rates
Figure 2A presents program effects for participant employment rates
(positive earnings).

The x-axis is labeled “Years Since Clean Slate Intervention,” with 0
representing the year of intervention (and corresponding to the j index). The
y-axis is labeled “Estimated Effect” and gives the percentage rate of
employment (positive earnings) of the estimated program effects, with 0
representing the baseline employment rate.201 As a reminder, the SSA data
allow us to observe the number of individuals with positive formal sector
earnings. Our measure of the employment rate is simply the ratio of
individuals with positive earnings to all individuals in the cohort.
The results in Figure 2A show that in the years leading up to Clean Slate
treatment, there is a somewhat lower rate of employment than at baseline.
This effect is strongest four and five years before treatment and is essentially
zero in the three years just before treatment. Putting this result together with
the low average real earnings from Figure 2B below, it appears as though
participants are working at roughly the same rate but are losing earning
power. This likely reflects nominal wage cuts, or perhaps challenges with
obtaining enough hours, because the average real earnings effects are simply
too large to reflect inflation.
Notably, in the years after Clean Slate treatment, the employment rate
is generally above baseline. The effects are economically large, roughly five
201

Our method for establishing the baseline employment rate is described in Appendix D.
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to ten percentage points. To be concrete about the size of the effect, refer
back to Table 1 and recall that our study population has an employment rate
of about 75%. The estimates in Figure 2A suggest that the Clean Slate
intervention increases employment from the 75% baseline to 80% or 85%.
2. Average Real Earnings
Figure 2B is analogous to Figure 2A, but Figure 2B provides a graphical
presentation of the estimated program effects (𝜃) in Equation 1) for
participant average real earnings.

The x-axis is labeled “Years Since Clean Slate Intervention,” with 0
representing the year of intervention (and corresponding to the j index). The
y-axis is labeled “Estimated Effect” and gives the actual dollar value of the
estimated program effects, with 0 representing baseline earnings.202 As a
reminder, our measure of average real earnings is best thought of as total
formal sector earnings for the cohort, relative to all individuals in the cohort.
It is not average real earnings for the subset of the cohort that is working in
the formal sector.
While our sample size does not allow for precise estimation, Figure 2B
reveals several interesting patterns. First, in the years leading up to Clean
Slate intervention, average real earnings are low relative to baseline earnings.
The magnitude of the shortfall is quite large in economic terms—roughly
202

Again, our method for establishing baseline earnings is described in Appendix D.
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$4,000, or about a fifth of typical earnings in this sample, which is an already
meager $18,000 or so (but cf., Table 1).
Second, average real earnings tick up slightly in the year of treatment
and then grow rapidly. By three years after treatment, earnings have risen
from $4,000 below baseline to nearly $2,000 above baseline. The size of this
swing—nearly $6,000—is a very large magnitude, roughly a third of total
average earnings.
These results are consistent with a simple theory of program
participation and impact. The first component of this theory has to do with
the low earnings relative to baseline in the years prior to Clean Slate
treatment. Our theory is that the challenging labor market for people with
criminal records motivates them to seek help in clearing their record. The
second component of this theory has to do with the high earnings relative to
baseline in the years subsequent to Clean Slate treatment. Our theory is that
the Clean Slate intervention helped improve labor market outcomes for
participants.
The intervention theory is not the only theory that is consistent with
these findings. Although it seems implausible in the light of the employment
rate data, depressed earnings in the years leading up to the intervention could
mean that individuals chose to drop out of the labor force in anticipation of
participating in Clean Slate. Or perhaps the Clean Slate intervention simply
coincides with other activities or attributes. Under this account, the high
earnings relative to baseline in the years subsequent to the Clean Slate
intervention have little to do with the record clearing itself and instead reflect
the positive effects of the motivation and organization that leads individuals
to seek the intervention in the first place.203
We note a couple of interesting differences between the findings on
employment rates and earnings. First, while Figure 2A shows a large
increase in the employment rate in the year of the Clean Slate intervention—
about 6.5 percentage points—Figure 2B shows a very small effect on average
real earnings in the same year. These effect sizes suggest that those working
are seeing declines in average real earnings the year of the Clean Slate
intervention, while previously non-working participants are newly able to
find work. It is also possible that the employment rate effects in the year of
the Clean Slate intervention are primarily due to individuals gaining
employment late in the calendar year—captured as positive SSA earnings (an
on/off switch)—while the average earnings increase associated with
employment over time does not reveal itself until the calendar year after
203

In Appendix D, we discuss research designs that might allow one to distinguish these
different accounts.
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Clean Slate intervention. We cannot know for sure what explains the
differences, but the employment rate increase precedes the earnings increase.
The effects on employment rates and average earnings three years after
the intervention also show some differences. Figure 2A indicates that
average employment rates are beginning to fall at that point relative to where
they were one and two years out, while Figure 2B indicates that average real
earnings are higher three years after intervention than at baseline by almost
$2,000. These results might indicate that the Clean Slate intervention has
short-term labor market effects that fade over time. However, we are not
confident that strong interpretation on these effects is warranted at this point.
To summarize these findings, Clean Slate Clinic participants experience
a significant (if imprecise) increase in average employment rates (Figure 2A)
and average real earnings (Figure 2B) immediately following the record
clearing intervention, with employment rates declining three years out
(Figure 2A) for unknown reasons. Clean Slate Clinic participants experience
a period of suppressed earnings relative to their baseline in the years
immediately preceding the record clearing intervention (Figure 2B) in spite
of relatively active employment (Figure 2A). This is consistent with findings
from the job training literature about an earnings dip prior to program
participation.204
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The criminal records problem and remedies are multifaceted, and we
only measure the effects of one intervention (EBCLC’s record clearing
services, including dismissals and felony reductions) on one set of outcomes
(employment rates and earnings as reported to the Social Security
Administration) in one jurisdiction (Alameda County, California). While a
full exploration of prescriptions is beyond the scope of this study, we sketch
here some possible policy implications of our findings, including more record
clearing services, earlier intervention and expanded and improved remedies.
In recent years, advocates have been pressing for many of these reforms,205
and our findings suggest that such reforms improve employment outcomes.
First, given the apparent positive impact of the intervention on
employment rates and earnings, state and local jurisdictions should increase
the availability of record clearing services. The current patchwork of record
clearing programs is the product of innovative lawyers and programs, but is
not systematic, and many people with records have nowhere to get help.
Policymakers should strive to increase private, governmental, and
204
205

See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 48.
See VALLAS & DIETRICH, supra note 18, at 34–48.
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philanthropic resources to expand and rationalize a record clearing delivery
system.
The federal government has taken modest steps to facilitate such a
system. In 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice issued policy guidance to
recipients of Second Chance Act funds allowing them to pay for record
clearing and other legal services to help people with criminal records
overcome barriers to employment.206 In 2014, AmeriCorps awarded a grant
to the non-profit Equal Justice Works for the “Employment Opportunity
Legal Corps.”207 The program supports approximately thirty-seven lawyers
and 380 law students at placements in programs that assist people with
criminal records in removing barriers to jobs.208
Second, the earnings dip experienced by people with criminal records
prior to unmarking means that earlier intervention could increase wages and
reduce harm. Record clearing assistance, for example, could be provided as
a regular part of workforce development.209 The University of Maryland’s
Reentry Clinic staffs bi-weekly expungement workshops at the federally
funded American Jobs Center (One Stop) in Baltimore. With sufficient
resources and partnerships, such a model could be extended to many of the
nation’s nearly 2,500 One Stops.
Advocates have also pushed states to shorten the waiting time for record
clearing, which can help people with records and reduce recidivism.210 In
2015, New Jersey reduced the expungement waiting period for both
206
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Office of Justice Programs, Policy: Allowable Uses for Second
Chance Act Program Grant Funds (May 17, 2012). Such a use of funds continues to be
permitted in 2017. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SECOND CHANCE ACT COMPREHENSIVE
COMMUNITY-BASED ADULT REENTRY PROGRAM FY 2017 COMPETITIVE GRANT
ANNOUNCEMENT 9 (2017), https://www.bja.gov/funding/communityreentry17.pdf.
207
Elle Hogan, AmeriCorps Awards Equal Justice Works with Grant to Fund Employment
Opportunity
Legal
Corps,
EQUAL
JUSTICE
WORKS
(May
7,
2014),
http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/news/blog/EmploymentOpportunityLegalCorps.
Participating legal aid organizations and Equal Justice Works will supplement the $1.4 million
federal grant for a total budget of $2.5 million for three years. Karen Sloan, Program to Help
Job-Seekers
Expunge
Criminal
Records,
NAT’L L.J.
(May
6,
2014),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202654226256/Program+To+Help+JobSeekers+Ex
punge+Criminal+Records%3Fmcode=1202617074964&curindex=1&curpage=ALL.
208
E-mail from Anne Bloom, Dir. of Pub. Programs for Equal Justice Works, to Josh
Epstein, law student at UC Berkeley School of Law (June 17, 2016) (on file with authors). In
its first two years, the program reports lifting almost 30,000 barriers on behalf of more than
10,000 people with criminal records. E-mail from Toya Lynch, Sen. Program Manager for
Equal Justice Works, to Josh Epstein, law student at UC Berkeley School of Law (Oct. 18,
2016) (on file with authors).
209
CAREERONESTOP, https://www.careeronestop.org/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).
210
Most recidivism occurs within three years of completing a sentence. See JACOBS, supra
note 11, at 131 (explaining that people who have just completed a sentence are in immediate
need of help).
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misdemeanors and felonies though an “early pathway” option;211 in 2016,
Missouri significantly reduced the waiting period for expungable felonies
and misdemeanors.212 We do not know how many Clean Slate participants
sought assistance as soon as they were legally eligible or if they waited for
other reasons, but our findings suggest that earlier record clearing as a result
of shorter waiting times could reduce the earnings dip.
Third, our findings regarding both the benefits of the intervention and
the harm of delay are consistent with a number of efforts to expand and
improve record clearing remedies. U.S. Senators Rand Paul and Corey
Booker introduced the Record Expungement Designed to Enhance
Employment Act to permit sealing of nonviolent convictions, which would
create a record clearing remedy for federal offenses.213 States as diverse as
Indiana, Louisiana, and Kentucky recently extended record clearing
eligibility to people with certain felony convictions,214 and Maryland and
Pennsylvania expanded their record sealing and expungement.215
To increase the reach and benefits of unmarking, jurisdictions could
permit automatic record clearing by operation of law.216 Connecticut permits
erasure of records for all cases in which a person is found not guilty or the
charge is dismissed, Arkansas presumptively expunges most misdemeanors
absent a showing of clear and convincing evidence by the prosecutor, and
New Jersey permits both automatic and immediate expungement of
non-conviction records and immediate expungement after successful

211

See 2015 N.J. Laws ch. 261 (reducing the wait from ten to five years for a felony and
five to three years for a misdemeanor if a court finds expungement “is in the public interest,
giving due consideration to the nature of the offense, and the applicant’s character and conduct
since the conviction”).
212
See MO. REV. STAT. § 640.140 (2011) (reducing the wait from twenty years to seven
years following completion of a felony sentence, and from ten to three years following
completion of a misdemeanor sentence, though limiting the number of lifetime expungements
and the effect of expungement and permitting some employers and licensing agencies to
consider expunged convictions).
213
REDEEM Act, S. 2567, 113th Cong. (2014).
214
IND. CODE § 35-38-9 (2015); H.R. 40, 16 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016), 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 94;
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 971 et seq. (2014). Unfortunately, some states still charge a
high fee for record clearing—in Kentucky, the filing fee for an expungement motion is $500—
which undermines access to the remedy, especially for low-income people. See H.R. 40, 16
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2016), 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 94.
215
S. 1005, 2016 Sess. (Md. 2016), 2016 Md. Laws ch. 515; S. 166, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2015), 2016 Pa. Laws 10, No. 5. States are also clarifying how cleared records are to be treated
in the employment context, including non-disclosure on the part of the applicant and nondiscrimination on the part of the employer. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13–
17.
216
European countries automatically seal most criminal records. JACOBS supra note 11,
at 119.
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completion of drug court.217 The most ambitious automatic sealing bills to
date were introduced in Pennsylvania.218 Under the “Clean Slate” bills, both
misdemeanor and felony convictions would be automatically sealed from
public use after a set period of time and assuming no further convictions.219
However, even as states take remedial measures on mass
criminalization, they continue to add crimes and collateral consequences.220
On the front end of the process, jurisdictions could reduce the creation of
criminal records through a variety of strategies, including
decriminalization.221 On the back end of the process, unmarking only works
if courthouses, public repositories, and private background check companies
maintain and share accurate records.222
To regulate the use of criminal records by employers, state and local
jurisdictions have adopted fair hiring measures such as ban-the-box and
licensing reforms, and they have incentivized hiring of people with criminal
217
CONN GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (1976); 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011); H.R.
1608, 2015 N.J. Laws ch. 261.
218
See S. 1197, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015); H.R. 1984, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015).
219
CMTY. LEGAL SERV. OF PHILA., Employment: “Clean Slate” Bills Introduced in
Pennsylvania (Apr. 13, 2016), https://clsphila.org/news/clean-slate-bills-introducedpennsylvania. But see Love, supra note 102, at 1726 (arguing against forgetting remedies like
expungement because they rewrite history, downplay concerns about public safety, ignore the
reach of technology, and miss opportunities to reintegrate people with criminal records).
220
See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that in spite of efforts in
some states to mitigate the collateral consequences associated with criminal records, new
crimes and attendant collateral consequences continue to be added each year); Love, supra
note 115 (arguing that the Vera Institute’s report provides an inaccurately optimistic picture
of the landscape of state law collateral consequences and suffers from methodological flaws).
221
To reduce the need for unmarking, states can decriminalize certain activities (like
marijuana use), reclassify appropriate crimes (from felonies to misdemeanors and
misdemeanors to infractions), and create alternatives to arrests (warning) and prosecution (like
pretrial diversion). See JACOBS supra note 11, at 94–98 (describing these strategies); see also
SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 21 (mentioning states that have built relief mechanisms
into the “front-end” of the criminal justice process).
222
Critics argue that the FBI database (compiled of state records) is inaccurate and that
background check companies report mistaken information about people and their records,
often in violation of consumer and privacy laws. See YU & DIETRICH, supra note 89, at 15
(critiquing the accuracy of records provided by private background check companies);
Roberts, supra note 5, at 344 (for a discussion of problems with the FBI database). Congress
has considered but failed to enact legislation to improve the accuracy of the FBI criminal
database and criminal background checks. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 344 (discussing
Congressional attempts to improve the accuracy of the FBI database, including references to
the Fairness and Accuracy in Employment Background Checks Act and the Accurate
Background Check Act, neither of which was enacted). Even records correctly cleared in
public repositories may linger for use by background check companies in proprietary industry
databases. See generally Sharon M. Dietrich, Preventing Background Screeners from
Reporting Expunged Criminal Cases, SHRIVER CTR. (Apr. 2015); Jones, supra note 171, at
255.
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records through tax credits and negligent hiring mitigation for employers.223
In general, reformers have proposed individualized screening that more
closely ties the inquiry about a person’s criminal record to the relevant
employment opportunity.224 As is evident from some of the recent studies of
ban-the-box policies, much remains to be done to end racial discrimination
in the employment setting beyond fair hiring initiatives and record clearing
for people with criminal records.225
C. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

Our findings raise a number of unanswered questions. These questions
fall into several categories, including who benefits from the intervention, the
durability of the program effects, the relevance of our findings in other legal
settings and labor markets (including opportunities to study differences
between jurisdictions), and other possible program effects. All of these are
ripe for further research.
First, because of the aggregate nature of our data, we do not know within
the sample if some people benefited more than others from the intervention.
Does the nature of the underlying record matter? Perhaps some kinds of
cleared records are stickier than others in the context of employment
outcomes. Because discrimination by employers clearly still operates in the
face of fair hiring policies, do the employment outcomes of unmarking vary
by the race, gender, or other characteristics of program participants?
Second, we do not yet know enough about the durability of the program
223

SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 14, at 23 (describing how twenty-two states and the District
of Columbia enacted such laws between 2009 and 2014). More than 150 local jurisdictions
and twenty-nine states restrict the use of criminal records in the early stages of the hiring
process. AVERY & HERNANDEZ, supra note 15, at 1. States have also begun heeding the call
to ease licensing restrictions. Fact Sheet: New Steps to Reduce Unnecessary Occupation
Licenses that are Limiting Worker Mobility and Reducing Wages, THE WHITE HOUSE (June
17, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-sheet-new-stepsreduce-unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting. The Obama Administration issued a
directive to all federal departments and agencies to ensure that “agencies with statutory
authority to grant or deny occupation licenses . . . to revise their procedures to provide that
such licenses are not denied presumptively by reason of an applicant’s criminal record.”
Presidential Memorandum – Promoting Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Formerly
Incarcerated
Individuals,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
(Apr.
29,
2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/presidential-memorandumpromoting-rehabilitation-and-reintegration.
224
See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, THE UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2010),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf
(adopted by the American Bar Association in 2010 and designed to rationalize and clarify state
policies and practices regarding collateral consequences).
225
Supra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text.
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effects. Will the average employment rates and earnings stay above baseline,
rise further, or fade? Perhaps employment rates and earnings reflect greater
short-term motivation and heightened effort rather than improved labor
market opportunities. If more data and research determine that the effects of
the intervention are ephemeral, what might be done to sustain earnings and
employment in the medium to long term?
Third, while we believe that EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic is generally
representative of other record clearing programs, there are many other
external variables to consider. As noted above, local laws and practices vary
widely in terms of record creation (enforcement, charging, and sentencing),
record clearing (eligibility and granting), and record reporting (accuracy and
availability).226 Labor market conditions and sorting vary by time and place,
and employers in certain subsectors may be indifferent to an applicant’s
criminal record.227 Any attempt to generalize findings about the effects of a
local criminal record clearing program should be undertaken with caution.
Fourth, the heterogeneity of local laws and practices actually presents
opportunities for natural experiments regarding discrete policy choices and
program outcomes. For example, researchers could study program effects in
states with different record clearing regimes to better understand the
conditions under which remedies yield benefits. We might also measure the
relative effectiveness of state and federal job training grantees that include
legal record clearing to achieve program goals.228
Fifth, we did not study other possible benefits of the record clearing
intervention. For example, we would expect increased earnings to yield
increased tax revenues. In fact, neighboring jurisdictions might even
compete to expand employment opportunities for residents with criminal
records.229 Higher wages would presumably generate greater economic
226
For an example in an analogous setting, see Alec C. Ewald, Rights Restoration and the
Entanglement of U.S. Criminal and Civil Law: A Study of New York’s “Certificates of Relief,”
41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 6 (2016) (arguing that differences in the ways that judges and
probation officers award administrative “Certificates of Relief” in New York arise from local
agreements, individual discretion, and legal ambiguity).
227
For example, researchers have found that racial discrimination is more pronounced in
service industry or “front of the house” jobs where employers are reluctant to hire AfricanAmerican men. Devah Pager, Bruce Western & David Pedulla, Employment Discrimination
and the Changing Landscape of Low-Wage Labor Markets, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 336
(2009) (noting that employers may be “concerned about the soft skills of black men, or . . .
relying on assumptions about what their customers or clients prefer”). Recent research
suggests that participants who began but did not complete a record clearing process still
benefited from improved employment outcomes in sectors of the economy where the existence
of a record may be less impactful. Loeffler et al., supra note 21, at 3.
228
Thank you to Karen Lash for this suggestion.
229
Thank you to Jenny Roberts for this insight. E-mail from Jenny Roberts, Professor of
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activity in neighborhoods with record clearers, creating a multiplier effect
that increases community wealth.
Because evidence suggests that
employment opportunities for people with criminal records reduce
recidivism,230 we would also expect a range of criminal justice-related cost
savings.231
Finally, and related to additional benefits, it is important to remember
that record clearing programs typically have a number of goals, not all of
which can be measured by employment rates and earnings. In a companion
qualitative study underway, preliminary data from surveys, focus groups, and
in-depth interviews suggest that EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic clients place a
high dignity value on clearing their criminal records.232 That is, the relative
merit of such programs should be assessed more broadly than their impact on
employment outcomes alone. In fact, the status enhancement that comes with
record clearing may be a critical element in providing people with criminal
records the confidence or other positive attributes needed to be more
successful in the job market.
CONCLUSION
Criminal records are ubiquitous and consequential for tens of millions
of people, especially in the employment context where they limit
opportunities and suppress earnings.
Addressing these negative
consequences has become an important public policy goal. Legal services

Law, American Univ. Washington College of Law, to Jeffrey Selbin, Clinical Professor of
Law, UC Berkeley School of Law (July 20, 2016) (on file with author).
230
See Lahny Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent
Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 162 (2011) (finding that within a group of people
convicted of federal offenses, those who secured post release employment recidivated at a rate
of 25% while those who did not recidivated at a rate of 50%); see generally Garima Siwach,
37th Fall Research Conference Panel Paper, Criminal Background Checks and Recidivism:
Evidence from Direct Access Care in New York State, ASS’N PUB. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
(2015) (finding that being denied work at the New York Department of Health increased the
likelihood of re-arrest within the next three years for applicants with criminal records).
231
See, e.g., ECON. LEAGUE OF GREATER PHILA., ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF EMPLOYING
FORMERLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS IN PHILADELPHIA, 8 (2011), http://economyleague.
org/uploads/files/712279713790016867-economic-benefits-of-employing-formerlyincarcerated-full-report.pdf (estimating the economic impact of hiring people with criminal
records, including “avoided costs in the form of avoided spending on criminal justice agencies,
social services, and government cash transfers, as well as prevented victim costs.”).
232
Reiter et al., supra note 156. See also Ericka Adams et al., Erasing the Mark of a
Criminal Past: Ex-Offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance, 19
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 23, 27, 43 (2017) (finding that the process of record clearing facilitates
cognitive transformation and the affirmation of a new identity); Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, supra
note 97, at 406–09 (finding that stigma motivates people with criminal records to seek
expungement remedies).
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providers have developed record clearing programs as a mitigation strategy.
Public defenders, civil legal aid offices, and law school clinics are assisting
people with criminal records to seek legal remedies to dismiss or expunge
records of past arrests and prosecutions. During this period of growth and
experimentation, and with so much at stake, it is important to know if, how,
and for whom this unmarking intervention works.
Our study sheds light on these questions. With the limits and trade-offs
involved in any research method, our findings suggest that the record clearing
intervention delivers on its promise. People with criminal records seek the
unmarking remedy after a period of declining earnings, in spite of active
labor market participation. During or immediately after the intervention,
average employment rates and earnings appear to rise, though the staying
power of such increases is still unclear.
This study cannot begin to answer all of the significant questions about
effective record clearing interventions and policies. Nevertheless, it provides
initial baseline data that can inform unmarking policies and practices while
identifying additional avenues and methods for research. Over time, we hope
this will assist communities and lawmakers to implement more targeted and
effective strategies to help people with criminal records overcome barriers to
employment and other opportunities.
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APPENDICES
A. RESEARCH METHODS

In any study of the effect of a program intervention on a participant, one
can imagine two states of affairs. In the first, a person eligible for the
intervention participates in it. In the second, the same individual does not
participate in the intervention and is therefore not affected by it. The impact
of the intervention would be the difference between these two states of
affairs.
The impossibility of having the same person both participate and not
participate in an intervention is often referred to as the Fundamental Problem
of Causal Inference, with the problem being that further assumptions are
needed to evaluate the causal effect of any program.233 This generic
evaluation problem can be thought of as a problem of “internal validity.” A
research design is internally valid for estimating the effect of a program if it
provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of the program for those who
participated in it.234
An altogether different evaluation challenge pertains to the “external
validity” of the study. The problem of external validity is that even an
internally valid research design can fail to deliver an unbiased estimate of the
measurement of interest because the effect of the program differs across
populations and the study population was not the population of interest. This
is a kind of selection effect, and it may confound our ability to measure the
treatment effect.
For instance, in the context of EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic, one could
imagine that those who sought assistance were more proactive and ambitious
than other eligible people who did not seek assistance. It might be that these
qualities are associated with particularly pronounced effects of the program
intervention. Thus, any study regarding the impact of an intervention must
wrestle with two serious evaluation challenges: (1) the internal validity
counterfactual question: “What would have happened if the individuals who
sought out the intervention had not done so?” and (2) the external validity
extrapolation question: “Is the study population the population of interest?”
233

This notion of a program effect on an outcome has a complicated and contested
intellectual history. The “two states of affairs” idea, discussed above, originates with Jerzy
Neyman, but the notion and some related ideas are often referred to as the Rubin Causal Model.
See generally Guido W. Imbens, Nonparametric Estimation of Average Treatment Effects
Under Exogeneity: A Review, 86 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 4 (2004) (for citations to the early
literature); see also Jeffrey Smith, A Critical Survey of Empirical Methods for Evaluating
Active Labor Market Policies, 136 SWISS J. ECON. & STAT. 247, 248 (2000).
234
There may also be contexts where internal validity pertains to the ability to obtain an
unbiased estimate of a related population or sub-population, but we do not cover that case here.
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Researchers have experimented with different methods in an effort to
solve or minimize these problems, particularly that of internal validity. Each
of the approaches discussed below uses a different way to develop a
comparison group that compellingly approximates the impossible
counter-factual of what would have happened had intervention participants
abstained from participation. We describe these methods because they help
to explain some of the strengths and limits of our study design.
1. Randomized Controlled Trials
The randomized controlled trial (“RCT”) is generally viewed as the
ideal way to overcome the evaluation problems described above. In an RCT,
some fraction of people seeking participation in a program are randomly
admitted or denied.235 Denied individuals then serve as a control group and
their outcomes are compared with those of participants.236
Randomization overcomes the concern that hidden characteristics (like
social networks, tenacity, or gumption) are producing the outcome attributed
to the intervention. Although people in both the experimental and control
groups have sought out the intervention (and therefore may have different
dispositions from the larger pool of eligible participants), a randomized filter,
like a coin toss, is not privy to these dispositional differences. As a result,
these hidden characteristics will be distributed roughly evenly between the
experimental and control groups and their effect can be discounted, leaving
the impact of the intervention.
Despite the appeal of this model, it is not always effective or even
available in practice. People in the experimental group sometimes abandon
the intervention before it is complete, and those in the control group might
find a comparable intervention elsewhere.237 Further, implementing a
randomized controlled trial means denying people access to a program or
intervention that might help them. Organizations like EBCLC’s Clean Slate
Clinic strive not to turn away people eligible for services, making it hard to
establish the classic control group. Job training programs in the 1960s and

235

In perhaps the most well-known RCT study of a civil legal aid intervention, researchers
randomized an offer of assistance, not the intervention itself (to try to limit the selection effects
of subsequent participation). Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 199, at 2118.
236
See id. for a robust defense of the use of RCTs in studying interventions in civil legal
aid. But see Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 106–12 (2013) (for a critique describing the limits
of RCTs in this setting).
237
Raphael & Stoll, supra note 31, at 14; Selbin et al., Resource Allocation and Access to
Justice, supra note 180, at 51–53 (describing these concerns with respect to the Greiner &
Pattanayak RCT design in the unemployment insurance context).
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70s were likewise unable to conduct randomized controlled trials.238
Because randomization is often unavailable, researchers have found
other ways to construct a meaningful comparison group, such as methods
built around assumptions of “selection on observables” (econometric
parlance) or “conditional independence” (statistical parlance).239 We discuss
this type of approach next. There are a large number of competing
approaches in the field, but we focus on matching because it is emblematic
of the general approach.240
2. Matching
Matching tries to solve the evaluation problem by linking each
intervention participant with a non-participant doppelgänger. For each
program participant, the goal is to find a person from a pool of possible
controls who is so similar that evaluating the individual’s outcomes is akin
to evaluating what would have happened had the participant herself not
participated. This amounts to assuming that—within narrow groups defined
based on available characteristics—there is randomization into treatment and
control units.241
Matching is based on those characteristics observable to the researcher
(such as age, gender, ethnicity, zip code, or perhaps socioeconomic status).
Even assuming that the researcher has access to the relevant set of
observables, the method for selecting which match from among many
candidates is complicated. Any time there is more than a single
characteristic, there is no unique definition of “close” and thus a variety of
choices can be justified. Moreover, there is often vigorous disagreement
regarding which variables are to be matched on.242
Debate about the efficacy of matching has taken up the more general
challenge to “selection on observables” approaches posed in a famous article
by Robert LaLonde.243 In that article, LaLonde compares the results of an
238

See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 48.
See Imbens, supra note 233, at 4.
240
See generally Matias Busso et al., New Evidence on the Finite Sample Properties of
Propensity Score Reweighting and Matching Estimators, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 885 (2014)
(reviewing many of these approaches, with a focus on their finite sample performance).
241
That membership in groups is based on observable characteristics gives rise to the
“selection on observables” terminology. See Imbens, supra note 233, at 4. Program participants
and controls are assumed to differ systematically only because of those variables observed by
the researcher.
242
See Raphael & Stoll, supra note 31, at 21 (labeling this the “problem of variable
selection”).
243
See Robert J. LaLonde, Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs
with Experimental Data, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 604, 617–18 (1986).
239
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RCT that measured the impact on earnings of an employment training
program with those of many different econometric techniques, all of which
invoke “selection on observables” (matching). LaLonde shows that the
training effect estimated by these models is sensitive to the composition of
the comparison group as well as to the variables used in adjusting for
differences between the treatment and control group.244 This is especially
problematic because absent the experimental results LaLonde used as a
benchmark for evaluating the accuracy of different matching models, the
researcher has no principled way of choosing between the models. To get
things right would require either good luck or advanced knowledge of the
intervention’s impact, the unavailability of which motivates estimation in the
first place.
More recent arguments hinge on whether updates to “selection on
observables” techniques can be used to replicate the findings of an RCT (e.g.,
propensity matching, which matches people in the treatment and comparison
groups based on their estimated probability of participating in the relevant
program, given their observables). Despite an exceedingly lengthy
discussion in the academic literature, there is not yet consensus on a valid
substitute for experimental methods, giving rise to the notion of “the
LaLonde critique.”245
Even after these theoretical challenges to the matching model have been
set aside, researchers can still face practical problems. Much of the debate
initiated by LaLonde concerns the problem of having to choose between
different ways of matching study participants. Yet this is irrelevant if the
data used to select a match is not detailed enough to enable a good match in
the first place. In LaLonde’s context, comparison groups were selected from
population surveys like the Current Population Survey and the Continuous
Work History Sample, both of which are random samples.246 Pulling a
comparison group out of a population survey was easier in the context of job
244

Id. at 614.
See Rajeev H. Dehejia & Sadek Wahba, Causal Effects in Nonexperimental Studies:
Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs, 94 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 1053 (1999)
(arguing that the estimates of the training program’s impact produced by propensity matching
are comparable to the experimental benchmark estimate); see also Donald B. Rubin & Neal
Thomas, Combining Propensity Score Matching with Additional Adjustments for Prognostic
Covariates, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 573 (2000) (for a more recent defense of propensity score
matching). But see James Heckman et al., Sources of Selection Bias in Evaluating Social
Programs: An Interpretation of Conventional Measures and Evidence on the Effectiveness of
Matching as a Program Evaluation Method, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 13416 (1996)
(finding that propensity matching eliminates some but not all of the selection bias, which
distorts the estimated impact of the studied intervention).
246
See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 48 (on the Continuous Work History Sample); see
also LaLonde, supra note 243, at 611 (on the Current Population Survey).
245
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training programs because so many people have experienced a spell of
unemployment at some point in their lives and this fact facilitates matching
based on income trajectory.
The criminal records context is more challenging than the canonical job
training example. Although tens of millions of adults have criminal records,
the subset of adults who could avail themselves of a record clearing remedy
is often hard to ascertain, because few surveys ask questions regarding a
criminal record. This makes it all the more difficult to find in a standard
population survey an appropriate comparison group from the participant’s
local economic environment.247
Assuming the researcher can find an appropriate comparison group, the
potential for inconsistency in the measurement of outcomes poses an even
thornier problem. For instance, in our study, we obtained participants’
earnings data from the Social Security Administration. This approach to
measurement was only possible because we had their social security numbers
(“SSN”) and dates of birth. We do not know the SSNs of non-participants,
and in most contexts, a researcher would be in a like position. If participants
in our study had been matched using a population survey, we would have had
to use the survey-reported earnings of the comparison group due to the
unavailability of SSNs. And if survey-reported earnings and the Social
Security Administration’s earnings data differ from one another, estimated
differences between participants and the comparison group might reflect less
the role of the intervention of interest and more the way earnings were
measured.
B. EARLY-VERSUS-LATE ADOPTERS HYPOTHESIS AND MODELLING

To develop intuition regarding our early-versus-late adopters approach,
first consider two hypothetical scenarios in which the record clearing
intervention might affect earnings. In the first scenario, having participated
in the program allows a person access to a job they might not otherwise have
been able to access. In this scenario, participation leads to a permanent
increase in earnings (we assume the person retains the job for which they are
newly eligible). People signing up earlier receive an earnings bump earlier.
This first scenario is depicted graphically in Appendix Figure 1. We
describe the study sample in more detail later, but our four cohorts of program
participants were “treated” (served by EBCLC’s Clean Slate Clinic) in the
2nd half of 2007 (Cohort 1), the first half of 2008 (Cohort 2), the second half
of 2008 (Cohort 3) and the first half of 2009 (Cohort 4), respectively. In
247

See Raphael & Stoll, supra note 31, at 382 (describing the difficulty of finding a
comparison group in population surveys).
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Appendix Figure 1, the earnings bump for Cohort 1 is labeled ABC.

We assume that the earnings bump phases in halfway in 2007 because
people in this cohort were not treated until halfway through the year. For
graphical purposes, we have also assumed that each successive cohort has
earnings $100 above that of the cohort preceding them. This has nothing to
do with the record clearing intervention; it is simply an assumption that the
different cohorts might have time-invariant differences reflecting a
compendium of factors unrelated to the program of interest, and it allows for
a clearer picture of the relative trajectories of each cohort.
Turning to Cohort 2, the earnings bump is depicted in Appendix Figure
1 with the label “DE.” Earnings for this cohort adjust in a more punctuated
way than for Cohort 1—rising in one year rather than in two—because the
timing of treatment aligns with the onset of the calendar year. Cohorts 3 and
4 are analogous to Cohorts 1 and 2, but their earnings bumps are shifted
forward by one calendar year on the x-axis. To maintain a focus on ideas,
we have assumed there is no statistical “noise” associated with any of the
estimates.
The second scenario is depicted graphically in Appendix Figure 2. Here,
the record clearing intervention hypothetically boosts earnings only
temporarily (i.e., only during participation in the actual program). In the
figure, the earnings bump for Cohort 1 is labeled ABC again. Rather than
being a bump that is consistent with long-run earnings improvement, here,
the bump is ephemeral, fading after the half-year in the program. This might
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be consistent with the notion that earnings respond less to the labor market
opportunities participants might be able to avail themselves of, and more to
the immediate fact of counseling and the enthusiasm of a presumptive peak
in personal organization and efficacy. The earnings bumps for Cohorts 2, 3,
and 4, labeled “DEF,” “GHI,” and “JKL,” respectively, are similarly
ephemeral. Cohorts 2 and 3 experience the bump in the same year because
both are treated for a portion of 2008 (the first and second half of the year,
respectively).

Both of these scenarios assume that program participants seeking
assistance at different dates are ex ante similar to one another (the $100
differential between cohorts in Appendix Figure 1 was for graphical
purposes). There is, however, a long line of research in job training programs
that indicates individuals self-select into seeking assistance based on their
earnings or employment trajectories. In particular, a well-known empirical
pattern is for individuals to be more likely to avail themselves of training
programs in the years subsequent to a “dip” in their earnings. This pattern is
often referred to as the “Ashenfelter dip” after Orley Ashenfelter, a leading
author in the early literature on the effect of job trainings programs on the
earnings of program participants.248
248

See Ashenfelter, supra note 185, at 55 (observing the pre-job training dip in earnings
for the first time); Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, Using the Longitudinal Structure of
Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs, 67 REV. OF ECON. & STATS. 648, 650
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To appreciate what the Ashenfelter dip might look like, Appendix
Figure 3 depicts earnings for each cohort over time. In the figure, we have
assumed that program participants experience a decline in earnings prior to
availing themselves of the Clean Slate intervention. We have also assumed
that the earnings decline does not continue after the program begins.

The pattern depicted in Appendix Figure 3 could arise through two quite
distinct (if related) causal mechanisms. Under the first mechanism, the
program might itself stem the earnings slide in a causal way (e.g., preserving
employment options in an increasingly challenging economy). Under the
second mechanism, program participation is just a marker of other life
choices. A participant confronting an earnings slide (e.g., due to decreases
in hours available from an employer or job loss) might take that reality as a
“wake-up call” and engage in several life changes at the same time. For
example, a person might seek help from her friends or a local church at the
same time as she is availing herself of record clearing services.

(1985) (confirming the dip in the context of another job training program); Laurie J. Bassi,
Estimating the Effect of Training Programs with Non-Random Selection, 66 REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. 36, 43 (1984); James J. Heckman et al., The Economics and Econometrics of Active
Labor Market Participants, 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECON. 1865, 1892–93 (1999) (showing
the dip in a variety of training programs from around the world);
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C. OTHER FIGURES

Appendix Figures 4 and 5 display raw aggregate data from the SSA.
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D. REGRESSION MODEL AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In this appendix, we discuss in greater detail the regression model we
used in the study. We also consider what such modelling might look with
alternative data sources, particularly microdata on individual labor market
outcomes for those obtaining treatment and those not obtaining treatment.
With the data available in our study, we used the following equation:
Equation 1
+

)

𝑌"# = 𝜇" + 𝜆# +

𝜃) 𝐷"# + 𝜀"#
),-.

)

In Equation 1, the Roman letters 𝑌"# and each of the 𝐷"# represent data,
whereas the Greek letters 𝜇" , 𝜆# and each of the 𝜃) represent parameters to be
estimated.249 The remaining term 𝜀"# is a residual term that indicates the
anticipated lack of a perfect fit of the regression model. The dependent
variable 𝑌"# is a labor market outcome for cohort c in year t and is taken to
be either average real earnings for a cohort in a year, or the employment to
)
population ratio for a cohort in a year. The covariates 𝐷"# are indicators,
sometimes also referred to as dummy variables, which are either zero or one,
with one “indicating” a particular state. Here, the particular state being
indicated is that for cohort c, the year t is j years after Clean Slate treatment.
0
For example, 𝐷"#
is zero unless it is the year in which the given cohort is
1
receiving Clean Slate treatment; 𝐷"#
is zero unless it is one year after
-1
treatment; and 𝐷"# is zero unless it is the year before treatment. Intuitively,
one can think of these covariates as leads and lags of treatment indicators.
The parameters of interest in this model are the 𝜃) , which correspond to
estimated program effects. For example, suppose the outcome were average
real earnings. Then 𝜃0 estimates the difference in average real earnings
between the year of Clean Slate treatment and in the baseline years; 𝜃1
estimates the difference in average real earnings between the year after Clean
Slate treatment and in the baseline years; and 𝜃-1 estimates the difference in
average real earnings between the year before Clean Slate treatment and in
the baseline years.
This then raises the question: what are the baseline years? Baseline
years are all years that fall outside the period five years before treatment to
three years after treatment. Intuitively, one can think of the baseline as
corresponding to average earnings several years before Clean Slate
249

-.
In the display, the summation symbol ∑ is a shorthand way of writing 𝜃-. 𝐷"#
+
without having to write out all the terms indicated by the ellipsis.

+
-4
	
  𝜃-4 𝐷"#
+. 	
  . 	
  . +	
  𝜃+ 𝐷"#
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treatment.250 The program effects prior to treatment can be thought of as
estimating selection effects, while those subsequent to treatment can be
thought of as estimating an admixture of selection and program effects. For
example, suppose that individuals chose randomly when to seek Clean Slate
services. Then the time path of earnings would fail to predict the year in
which an individual receives treatment, and the leads would be expected to
be statistically indistinct from zero.
A final question is how to choose the endpoints of the leads and lags,
which here we have taken to be -5 and 3. The choice of endpoints reflects
competing considerations. On the one hand, the wider the window used to
estimate program effects, the more informative the estimates might be
regarding the path of earnings leading up to and subsequent to program
participation. On the other hand, the wider that window, the fewer
observations are represented in the baseline, and this may lead to more noise
and possibly an estimate that is less robust to the exclusion of specific data
points. Another aspect of choosing the endpoints is that because treatment
occurs between 2007 and 2009, and we have data from 2000 to 2011, we can
effectively estimate more leads than we can lags. If we have data through
2014, for example, then we might well have chosen a right-hand endpoint of
5 or 6 rather than 3.251
Future research seeking to advance our knowledge of the effects of
record clearing interventions might focus on alternative data sources and
alternative research designs. Regarding alternative data sources, ideally
microdata on individual labor market outcomes would be available, both for
those obtaining treatment as well as those not obtaining treatment. Regarding
alternative research designs, the gold standard for understanding program
impacts remains random assignment, but there are different ways of
implementing random assignment, and there are also close cousins of random
assignment that may be more consistent with the goals of program
administrators. If microdata on individual outcomes could be combined with
random assignment, a great deal could be learned about the labor market
impacts of these programs.252

250

The baseline is 2000–2001 and 2011 for Cohort 1, 2000–2002 for Cohorts 2 and 3, and
2000–2003 for Cohort 4.
251
We hope to receive additional SSA employment rate and earnings data for our cohorts,
which would allow us to modify the right-hand endpoint accordingly.
252
For the sake of concreteness, we refer to “earnings” instead of “labor market outcomes”
but the discussion here is intended to be methodological in nature and thus pertains to any
outcome that could be collected. In principle, that could also involve survey data on labor
market outcomes, or even on outcomes that are not directly about labor market success but are
valuable in and of themselves (e.g., on self-reported dignity). We anticipate that cost reasons
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Suppose first that earnings are only available for those involved in the
program. As discussed above, this will typically be the case in any context
involving administrative data, for the simple reason that program
administrators possess identifying information for participants, but may not
for non-participants. To appreciate the value of data on individuals rather
than on cohort, consider the role of “cohort indicators” in Equation 1—that
is, the 𝜇" parameters. Cohort indicators are intended to capture time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity across cohorts c. This plays a more minor role in
estimation, but a potentially major role in inference.
This is a general conclusion and is not specific to our data or sample,
however, for the sake of concreteness, consider the regression results
undergirding Figure 3. One can estimate the 𝜃) parameters with or without
cohort indicators; this is simply estimating two alternative multivariate
regressions. The estimated 𝜃) parameters obtained these two ways are highly
similar to one another: viewing the 9 estimated 𝜃) parameters as data, they
have a correlation coefficient over 0.99. However, the regression with the
cohort indicators included shows much better fit overall (e.g., an R-squared
of 0.89 as opposed to 0.46 without the cohort indicators) and this can greatly
improve the precision of the estimated effects.
To summarize, if information on individual earnings is available, but
only for program participants, precision of the estimates is likely to improve
if the researcher has access to individual-level data, rather than cohort-level
data. Had we possessed data on individual earnings on participants only, we
would have estimated a minor variation on Equation 1:
Equation 2
+

)

𝑌6# = 𝜇6 + 𝜆# +

𝜃) 𝐷"# + 𝜀6#
),-.

Here, individuals are indexed by i. This would have involved a data set
with n=2,820 observations rather than n=48, and would have involved
estimating 234 𝜇6 parameters using an unweighted regression rather than
estimating 3 𝜇" parameters using a regression with cohort weights.253 Despite
will prevent most researchers from being able to survey participants and that administrative
data will be the basis for measuring labor market outcomes.
253
For technical reasons, the number of parameters to be estimated is one less than the
number of individuals or cohorts. The contrast between these regressions also clarifies an old
rule of regressions—the R-square is only sometimes valuable as a measure of goodness of fit.
The R-square from the cohort-level regression is inflated by virtue of the fact that the
individual-level variation is “hidden” from the regression by the aggregation to cohort-level
data.
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these superficial differences, the core notions of identification in these two
approaches are similar, and the estimates are likely to be similar.
Suppose next that earnings are available for participants as well as nonparticipants. The extent to which that additional information is valuable
hinges on the extent to which non-participants’ earnings approximate
participants’ earnings had they not obtained treatment. In terms of
observational statements (as opposed to statements regarding hypothetical
scenarios), non-participants are more likely to be valuable to the researcher
when their background characteristics and, more critically, the path of their
earnings leading up to treatment, are more similar.254
Sometimes non-participants are drawn from people who initiate contact
with program administrators and fail to follow through with treatment. Such
a group is presumably not as similar to participants as if treatment was
randomized, but is likely to be an improvement on a comparison group drawn
randomly from the local labor market. Recall that in our first example, with
data on only participants, the value of individual data was primarily about
improved precision. Here, access to a comparison group would likely have
an important effect on three different things: precision, robustness, and
identification.
Precision would improve in this example for two different reasons. As
before, the ability to estimate individual effects rather than cohort effects is
likely to improve precision. In addition, however, there is likely to be a
substantial gain in the precision of the estimated year effects, or the 𝜆#
parameters in Equations 1 or 2. This is important because in using an earlylate adopter research design, the year effects tend to covary substantially with
the estimated program effects. This is a challenge for estimation, and
improving the precision of the year effects spills over to improve the
precision of the program effects.
For the same reason, adding information on non-participants improves
robustness. The estimated year effects in a model estimated using data on
only participants can be sensitive to a small number of data points. If data
on non-participants are available, the year effects are less fragile. As before,
this improved robustness in the estimated year effects spills over to improved
robustness in the estimated program effects.
254

See Imbens, supra note 233, at 7. The hypothetical statement given is the accurate one:
the critical assumption is that non-participants’ earnings subsequent to treatment mimic what
participants’ earnings would have been in the absence of treatment, or “counterfactual
earnings.” Assuming that non-participants can be used to estimate counterfactual earnings
becomes less plausible if background characteristics of non-participants are dissimilar to those
of participants, or if earnings of non-participants prior to treatment exhibit different levels or
trajectories than those of participants.

SELBIN

72

1/25/18 11:13 AM

SELBIN, MCCRARY & EPSTEIN

[Vol. 108

Finally, identification itself may be improved. By “identification,” we
simply mean the ability to obtain an approximately unbiased estimate of the
program effects. Again, this depends on the similarity between the
participants and the comparison non-participants.

